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Ending Mass Incarceration By Michael Liebowitz


Michael Liebowitz, along with Brent McCall, is the coauthor of “Down The Rabbit Hole”, reviewed in February 2018 by Connecticut Commentary. Much has been written about reforming Connecticut prisons over the past two decades, most of it by academics and blabologists who have never seen the inside of a prison. I’ve known Michael, through the word only, for a few years; prisons are much harder to break into than out of, and so are prisoners. It is good for the general public to see the institutions they have created from the inside. The words that best describes everything that falls out of Liebowitz’s mind are “thoughtful” and even “scholarly,” as the reader will notice if he or she has the patience to lend Michael an ear. He is, after a couple of decades in prison, deeply analytical and grateful.    

 

Ending Mass Incarceration

By Michael Liebowitz

Introduction

 

I would argue that, strictly speaking, ending mass incarceration per se should not be the goal. Rather, what we ought to seek to accomplish is a significant reduction of criminal behavior. After all, if we simply set out to eliminate mass incarceration as our primary goal, it would be simple enough to achieve; just open the prison gates and release the bulk of the prison population. I highly doubt, however , that this “solution” would be palatable to the general public.

 

The questions are: Are there policies we can implement that ill dramatically reduce crime? And if so, what are they? I firmly believe the answer to the first question is yes, and the purpose of this plan is to articulate and propose such policies. Crime reduction will undoubtedly require a bold and comprehensive plan. And while due to my lack of resources I am unable to provide all the details I would like (such as cost, for example), I still think my plan meets these criteria.

 

It consists of the following:

 

·         End the War on Drugs

 

·         Widespread Implementation of Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic

 

 

·         Therapy (MST); Hold Juveniles Accountable

 

·         Widespread Implementation of Evidence-Based Programs

 

·         Widespread Implementation of Core Correctional Practices

 

·         Remunerate Correctional Officials and Employees Based on Results, i.e., Reduced Recidivism


·         Privately Fund a Significant Portion of Reform Programs

 

Let’s examine each of the plan’s components in turn.

 

 

End the War on Drugs

 

I argued above that our primary goal ought not to be to end mass incarceration, but to reduce crime. I pointed out the ease with which we could shrink the prison population by releasing prisoners en masse, but that the public would likely see this as undesirable. There is one type of offender, however, who should be released, and one type of crime that should be removed from the book: drug offenders and drug offenses. These two reforms would by themselves significantly reduce the prison population. Ending the “war on drugs”, however, would not only do this, but it would also reduce crime, and not just crimes related to sales and possession.

 

While there are both ethical and constitutional reasons to end this war, here I’m going to limit myself to a pragmatic, i.e., consequentialist argument. Before getting to that, however, let’s take a look at the history of the drug war and some of the reasons for its commencement.

 

Surprising as it may seem to some, drugs were perfectly legal for a large portion of this country’s history. Although considered “evil”  and “immoral”, their sale and consumption did not become object of prohibition until the late 1800’s. Even then, however, it was only some states, not the Federal government, that banned them. The federal prohibition would have to wait until the 20th century.

 

So, what changed? For starters, the late 1800’s were marked by high degrees of moralism and religiosity, with many calls for “vice” laws aimed at such “immoral” behaviors as gambling and prostitution. This was also a period of rapid change in society, characterized by large waves of immigrants and the development of big cities. These changes led to a predictable backlash from traditionalists wishing to maintain the status quo, and part of this backlash involved the implementation of drug laws. Also, one must not underestimate the racial impetus for these laws. There was a widespread fear of Chinese opium dens, while later on cocaine was associated in the public mind with African Americans and marijuana with African Americans and Mexicans. Noticeably absent from these reasons is any evidence that society was in great danger from these substances.

The Federal government’s first major foray into drug interdiction came in 1914 with the passage of the Harrison Act. Ostensibly a tax law, its real purpose was to end the drug trade. It applied to both opium and coca leaves, as well as their derivatives. But it was ultimately the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Harrison Act in Webb v. united Stated (1919) that made drug use a crime, and from then on linked the Federal government to drug laws.

 

Webb was a doctor who prescribed morphine to addicts in order to prevent them from experiencing withdrawal. This was a practice, the Court ruled, that Harrison did not allow. This may be looked at as the second major shot in what would become the war on drugs.

 

Next came the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which was established in response to the widely held false belief that drug use caused widespread criminal behavior. Then in 1961 the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs set forth the idea that drugs posed a threat to humanity. Following this, in 1971, President Nixon declared a war on drugs. With the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1971, the drug war became a permanent fixture of American life. [1]

 

So what have been the consequences of this war? Consider the following:

 

·         More than a trillion dollars have been spent. [2]

 

·         $100 billion a year is spent fighting this war, but supply, production and use have not diminished. [3]

 

·         The U.S. alone spends $51 billion a year. [4]

 

 

·         The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world. [5]

 

·         Almost 500,000 people are serving time for drug offense in the U.S. [6]

 

·         Prohibition has led to contaminated drugs and no way to know the strength of those drugs. [7]

 

As Lawrence M. Friedman wrote in “Crime and Punishment in American History”, “The prisons are jammed top to bottom with men and women convicted under drug laws. Is this really the only way? [8] I don’t think so.

 

Ending the war on drugs will likely lead to a substantial reduction the crime rate. If drugs were completely legalized, “crimes” such as sale and possession would be immediately eliminated. Also, the end of prohibition will lead to a large reduction in the price of these substances, thus crimes committed to finance expensive habits crimes such as robbery and larceny, for instance, will be rendered almost entirely unnecessary.

 

In my view the most serious crimes associated with the drug war are those that result from the competition for control of the all-too-lucrative black markets. From bosses of international cartels to low-level gang members, a wide variety of criminals have taken part in these battles. Who knows how many people have been assaulted, robbed, kidnapped, shot or killed as a consequence. And how many of those were innocent bystanders, “collateral damage” of this war? While ending the drug war will undoubtedly diminish these types of crimes, I wish I could be confident a more robust reduction. The reason I’m not is because I think it unlikely that those who currently profit from the drug trade will suddenly get nine-to-five jobs once it is no longer an option. It seems more reasonable to suspect that they’ll find or create new illicit ways to make money. After all, the Mafia didn’t retire with the end of alcohol prohibition. Nonetheless, as we’ll see, there is some historical evidence (also from alcohol prohibition) that ending the drug war will cause a large drop in violence.

 

It should also be noted that when freed from having to pursue petty criminals, dealers, and addicts, police will be able to focus their efforts on more serious offenders. This is likely to put a sizable dent in the crime rate in addition to those already mentioned.

 

In our country’s history, the closest analogy we have to the drug war is unquestionably alcohol prohibition. In 1919 Congress ratified the 18th amendment and the passed the Volstead Act, outlawing the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the U.S. With this prohibition came a high-crime era with gangs fighting over the illegal alcohol markets. Volstead was passed because people believed, correctly, that alcohol influenced violent behavior. However, it soon became obvious to most people that the “cure” was worse than the disease. (In a like manner, while drugs can certainly be harmful, outlawing them has caused more problems than does their use.)

 

Acknowledging prohibition’s dismal failure, in 1933 Congress repealed the 18th amendment and the Volstead Act. Did the world come to an end? Were there dire consequences? No, but there was at least one positive outcome. Criminologist Anthony Walsh notes “The homicide rate started a steep climb after the Volstead Act … was passed in 1920 (sic) as gangs fought over the lucrative alcohol market. The rate started to fall with the repeal of the Volstead Act in 1933 which effectively removed criminals from the alcohol business”. [9]

 

Why haven’t we learned from history? Why has the war on drugs lasted so long, with apparently no end in sight? I believe this has more to do with some misconceptions about drugs than it does with actual evidence. Let’s examine several of these misconceptions.

 

Drug use causes crime

 

In 1961 the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association issued a report in which they concluded that the psychological and physical addiction to drugs, combined with the high cost of those drugs, is what leads to crime, not drugs themselves. [10]  Also, numerous studies have shown that drug use does not cause crime, although it may lead to the commission of more serious crimes by those already living a criminal lifestyle. [11]  I don’t think it’s a stretch to assume that a predominant reason drug use results in criminals engaging in more serious illegal activity is the high costs of those drugs resulting from their illegal status.

 

 Drug use causes violence

 

According to Anthony Walsh, there are three types of violence linked to illicit drugs: systemic, economic – compulsive, and pharmacological. [12]

 

Systemic violence results from competition between rivals for the drug trade. Think cartels and gang violence.

 

Economic – compulsive violence is committed by addict to support their very expensive habits. A robbery committed to obtain drug money would be an example.

 

Pharmacological violence results from the properties of the drugs themselves. In other words, simply ingesting the drugs makes it more likely that someone will become violent.

 

The first two types of violence are a result of prohibition, not an argument for it. As for pharmacological violence, while not impossible it is rare. In fact, alcohol, a legal drug, is far more associated with violence than are illegal drugs. [13]

 

Drugs have harmful effects, such as addiction and overdoses.

 

Addiction is a serious problem, but most people who try psychoactive drugs do not become addicted to them. [14]  There is simply no reason to suspect this would change if these substances were legalized.

 

As for overdoses, they are far more likely under a regime of prohibition than if drugs were legal. This is because at present a person has no reliable means of knowing the potency of the drugs she’s buying, nor whether the drugs bought have been “cut” with contaminants.  If drugs were purchased legally, however, both the potency and ingredients would be listed on the package. Furthermore, although undoubtedly partially due to the fact that more people drink than use drugs, there are more deaths per year related to alcohol use that there are related to drug use, with 110,000 and 19,000 respectively. [15]  Yet we don’t see too many people clamoring for a “war on alcohol”.

 

Use will dramatically increase

 

             While I cannot prove this will not occur, the available evidence suggests it will not.

           

              Consider:


·         Countries that have decriminalized marijuana use have not seen large increase in prevalence.[16]

 

·         Many Western European countries have liberalized their drug policies, yet consumption has not dramatically increased. [17]

 

·         The U.K. government conducted a literature review of the approaches of other countries to drugs. They found “there is no apparent correlation between the ‘toughness’ of a country’s approach and the prevalence of … drug use.’” [18]

 

·         In the early 1990’s the Czech Republic decriminalized drug use. Then in 1998 they recriminalized possession for use. Advocates of this move believed it would reduce the availability and use of drugs. Shortly thereafter “… the Czech government decided to launch a scientific evaluation of the new drug law… The ultimate goal was to measure the expected benefits and to explore potential unintended negative impacts.” [19]  The evaluation showed that the new policy had no deterrent effect on problem users. The number of users actually increased. [20]

 

Many countries have given up their wars on drugs, instead initiating harm – reduction policies such as syringe exchanges, drug substitution , and decriminalizing personal use. And the Czechs notwithstanding, most of those countries have not returned to their previous policies (even the Czechs reinstituted decriminalization in 2010). [21]

 

Consider Portugal, which “… decriminalized all drug use in 2001, investing instead in public health services for people who use drugs. This has resulted in some very positive outcome, such as massive reductions in drug-related deaths and tumbling rates of HIV and hepatitis infections.” [22]

 

It is clear to me that the war of drugs must end. And surprisingly, to me at least, this is a somewhat common conclusion:

 

America’s approach to drug policy is disapproved of by 70% of U.S. citizens. [23]

 

Over half of U.S. citizens favor the legalization of marijuana. [24]

 

“… nine UN agencies have so far called for an end to the war on drugs.” [25]

 

In 2014 the Global Commission on Drug Policy recommended the decriminalization of drug use and possession and “experiments” in legalization of illicit drugs. [26]

 

So the war on drugs should end, but then what? While personally I believe that full legalization is the best way to go, it is certainly not the only available option. For instance, possession and use can be decriminalized, penalties can be reduced, mandated treatment can replace prison, and investment can be made in education and prevention. Certainly, all of these possibilities are better than what we have currently: A failed drug war that has led to violence , mass incarceration and broken families in our country and around the world.

 

Widespread implementation of Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic Therapy (MST); Hold Juveniles Accountable

 

Perhaps the best way to reduce crime is to intervene in the lives of at-risk and delinquent youths to prevent them from becoming full-blown adult criminals. Fortunately, there are two cost-effective programs that have been shown to reduce juvenile delinquency: FFT and MST. Let’s look at each of these.

 

There is an abundance of evidence which indicates that familial relationships have a significant effect on both the formation and continuance of juvenile delinquency. [27]  Thus, if the goal is to reduce such delinquency, it makes sense to target the entire family for intervention. This is precisely what FFT does.

 

“[FFT] … is a structured family-based intervention that uses a multi-step approach to enhance protective factors and reduce risk factors in the family.” [28]  Addressed to medium-risk youths between 10 and 18 and their families, [29]  it attempts to change the way family members communicate with one another, and thereby improve relationships within the family. [30]  The FFT therapist seeks to identify the “functions” the youth’s antisocial behaviors serve as well as the functions the other family members’ problem behaviors serve and attempts to show them how to satisfy these needs/wants with more productive behaviors. [31]

 

FFT employs an eclectic approach consisting of techniques taken from behavioral and cognitive behavioral therapy, as well as family systems approaches. [32]  It lasts between three and five months and consists of 12 to 14 visits. It is highly cost-effective at $3,531 per participant, with an anticipated benefit of $27,844. Thus, benefits minus costs equal $24,313 per participant, with a 96% chance that benefits will exceed costs. [33] For more information, see attached.

 

Created in the 1970s, MST is an intense program for youths ages 12 – 17 who have severe behavioral problems. [34]  The theoretical roots of the program are social, ecological and pragmatic family systems theories. At-risk youths are seen as belonging to numerous interconnected “systems” that exhibit a reciprocal influence on one another. These systems include the youth’s family, friends, school and community. “ … youth behavior problems are viewed as maintained by problematic transactions within and/or between any one or combination of these systems.”[35]  All of these areas serve as targets for interventions.

 

As a part of MST, therapists basically embed themselves within the family, allowing them to see how family members interact with each other. Particularly important is for therapists to mark the strengths the family already has. These strengths can then be built upon to improve family interactions. [36] 

 

An evidence-based program, MST addresses factors known to influence antisocial behavior in youths. Therapists provide individual and family counseling, implementing strategies from pragmatic, problem-focused, cognitive-behavioral, and family systems approaches. Interventions take place in the homes and communities of the youths and typically last between three and five months. [37] Among the goals of MST are to get kids to distance themselves from antisocial peers and activities, replace them with their pro-social counterparts, and to teach parents to employ more effective disciplinary strategies that make better use of rewards and punishments. [38]

 

In randomized trials, MST has been shown to reduce rearrests over the long term.[39]  It has been effective with serious felony offenders, including drug, violent, and sex offenders. Gains from treatment have been demonstrated to be intact after 13 years following an intervention.[40]  It costs $7,933 per participant and produces benefits of $14,134, for benefits minus costs equaling $6,161. The chances that benefits will exceed costs are 76%.

 

Of course, these programs don’t operate in a vacuum. They take place in a context in which juveniles know whether further misbehavior will result in adverse consequences for themselves. It is therefore imperative that there be the potential for such consequences otherwise the youths will have no real incentive to change. I know that many of you probably believe the incentive already exists, in the form of the rewards a pro-social life has to offer. It’s important to keep in mind, however, that all behavior, delinquent and pro-social alike, “works” on some level for the person engaging in it. The value structures of delinquents are such that they already find their way of life rewarding; the only way they’ll be willing to engage in the herculean effort that reform requires is if their cost-benefit assessment changes. And the only way this can happen is if they are made aware of the real possibility of punishment.

 

These punishments should be graduated. Perhaps they could begin with grounding moving up to community service, probation , house arrest, and in the case of serious of repeat offenders, a period of incarceration. If incarceration does become necessary it should take place in an environment where staff enforce  the rules in a firm, fair and consistent manner, rewarding good conduct and punishing bad. The kids should be required to attend school and participate in programs proven to reduce recidivism, such as Aggression Replacement Training (see attached).

 

I firmly believe that implementing FFT and MST on a large scale and holding juveniles accountable for their actions will greatly reduce juvenile crime. Perhaps more importantly, we will remove many kids from the path leading to a criminal career and instead place them on one leading to happy, productive lives.

 

Widespread Implementation of Evidence - Based Programs

 

Before delving into what I mean by “evidence – based programs”, I think it will be helpful first to briefly discuss the history of the idea that one of the purposes of prisons is to rehabilitate offenders.

 

The penitentiary system was created in the late 18th century and came into prominence in the 19th. From the beginning it was supposed that among the goals of incarceration was that of reforming the characters of criminals. Whether through the “silent system” at New York’s Auburn prison, or the “separate system” at Pennsylvania’s Cherry Hill prison, it was thought that removing offenders from society, making them labor intensively , and teaching them religion would get them to atone for their sins and alter their evil ways.[41]

 

By late in the 19th century it became clear that this model was failing, and changes were soon enacted. Labor and religion were still very much part of the prison experience, but new reforms, such as the indeterminate sentence, were added to the mix. While never fully implemented in practice, the idea of the indeterminate sentence was that there would be no specified period of time to which criminals would be sentenced. Instead, they would be released when their actions demonstrated that they were ready for society this was thought to provide offenders with the necessary incentive to reform themselves.[42]

               

Parole, probation, vocational education and rehabilitation programs developed in the early 20th century, making up what came to be known as the “rehabilitative ideal.” [43] Then in 1954 the American prison Association became the American Correctional Association and prisons became “correctional institutions.” [44]

               

After approximately 70 years as the dominant idea in criminal justice, the rehabilitative ideal fell into disrepute. The 1960s and 70s were turbulent  times characterized by several high-profile assassinations, war, protests, and rising crime rates. Many people lost faith in society’s ability to reform offenders. A perfect storm was in place for what was perhaps the most significant blow against the rehabilitative ideal: Robert Martinson’s “nothing works” report.

               

In 1974 Martinson and his colleagues released the results of a study they had conducted in which they concluded that, by and large, nothing works to reform offenders.[45] This conclusion soon assumed the status of dogma, a dogma that has been difficult to shake. Never mind the serious methodological weaknesses in the study; never mind the numerous studies that have shown the “nothing works” position to be erroneous; and never mind that prior to his death, Martinson himself partially reconsidered. The verdict was in: criminals were incorrigible. [46]

               

What does the evidence actually indicate? A plethora of studies have shown that certain types of programs, when implemented properly, lead to significant reductions in recidivism.[47]  One such study, or rather a meta-analysis of studies, has been expanded to include 225 studies yielding 374 tests of how judicial and correctional interventions impacted recidivism.[48]  Comparisons of these interventions were based on whether they adhered to 0, 1, 2, or 3 hypothesized effective principles of rehabilitation. The results were as follows: Criminal sanctions and inappropriate human service increased recidivism by two percentage points; human service adhering to one principle reduced recidivism by two points; human service consistent with two principles decreased recidivism by 18 points; and when adhering  to all three principles, human service reduced recidivism by 26 points. These results are undoubtedly impressive, but what exactly are these effective principles of rehabilitation? Answering this question is where I’ll now turn.

               

The model that informs effective correctional practices is the Risk, Need, Responsivity Model of Offender Assessment and Treatment. “By the late 1980s it was becoming clear that treatment could be effective in reducing offender recidivism, but it was unclear why some treatments were more effective than others. When reviewing the offender rehabilitation literature, D. A. Andrews, James Bonta and Robert Hoge (1990) observed certain patterns associated with the more effective treatment programs. They formulated three general principles for purposes of effective classification and correctional treatment: the (1) risk, (2) need, and (3) responsivity principles …”[49]  Although other principles have since been added to the model, these three still make up its core.[50]

               

According to the risk principle, programs will be most effective at reducing recidivism when addressed to moderate-to-high risk offenders. Also, the intensity of an intervention should match the risk level of the participants. Finally, it’s generally undesirable to mix high- and low-risk offenders together. [51]  The RNR model identifies eight central risk factors: 1) Criminal history; 2) Pro-criminal attitudes; 3) Pro-criminal associates; 4) Antisocial personality pattern; 5) Family / marital; 6) School / work; 7) Substance abuse; 8) Leisure / recreation. [52]

               

The need principle posits that the factors most associated with criminal behavior are the ones that should be targeted for intervention.   Perhaps you have noticed that of the above risk factors, only one (criminal history) is unchangeable  or “static”. The rest are changeable or “dynamic”. The seven dynamic risk factors are called “criminogenic needs”. Not only are these alterable, but they are the “factors most associated with criminal behavior.” These two characteristics make them appropriate for interventions. [53]

 

The responsivity principle is that interventions need to be appropriate to the characteristics of offenders. Two types of responsivity are encompassed by this principle, specific and general. Specific responsivity refers to the idea that interventions should be adapted to factors unique to the individual, such as age, gender and personality, for instance. General responsivity means that certain types of programs have been more effective than others in treating offenders.

               

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy addressed to criminogenic needs has been especially successful at reforming offenders. Among the characteristics of these programs is that therapists model pro-social behavior, participants engage in role playing to practice acting appropriately, and offenders learn cognitive restructuring. In this last, the therapist teaches the offender to identify his antisocial and irresponsible attitudes, values and beliefs and eliminate and replace them with their pro-social and responsible counterparts.[54]  Of particular importance is that offenders learn to take personal responsibility for their lives. It’s up to them to reform themselves and to maintain positive changes once they’ve been achieved. The offenders need to understand that no one can do this for them, and they owe it to themselves to try.[55]

            

An example of a program that fits the description “evidence-based” is the Reasoning & Rehabilitation (R&R) program created by Robert Ross. As part of the curriculum, group leaders instruct offenders how to replace deeply rooted antisocial thinking patterns with those pro-social in nature. The leaders also model pro-social behaviors so as to demonstrate to offenders what those behaviors look like in practice.[lvi]  R&R makes use of line-level correctional employees, the idea being that their participation has the benefit of getting them to buy-in to the program and become invested in the outcomes.[lvii]

               

In a study conducted in 1988 by Ross and others, R&R was compared with a “life skills” program and regular probationers. Only 18.1% or R&R participants recidivated, compared to 47.5% of those who took the life skills program and 69.5% of the regular probationers. [lviii]

               

A 1995 study by Porpino and Robinson found that R&R had its greatest benefit when conducted in the community. “A 66.3% reduction in new convictions was observed for offenders treated in the community compared with a 16.23% reduction among those from institutional programs.”[lix]

               

Almost as important as knowing what to do is knowing what not to do. When it comes to rehabilitation programs, not all are created equal. Not all programs reduce recidivism, and some actually increase it. Moreover, even evidence-based programs sometimes fail to achieve positive results. So what are the types of programs that are ineffective? And why do good ones sometimes miss the mark? Let’s see.

               

Ineffective approaches to treating offenders include client-centered, non-directive techniques; psychodynamic and insight-oriented methods; bibliotherapy and those that target non-criminogenic needs such as self-esteem and anxiety.[lx]  This last is vital. In order to be effective, programs must target criminogenic needs. In fact, those that spend the bulk of their time addressing noncriminogenic needs have been shown to increase, rather than reduce, recidivism. [lxi]

               

Unfortunately, in my 22 years of incarceration the vast majority of programs in which I’ve participated fit the criteria of ineffective approaches. Consider, for example, the Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP). The AVP facilitators’ manual describes the program as experiential, i.e., nondirective. Rather than directly teach offenders how to identify and alter their criminal thinking patterns, the program emphasizes that “solutions” will come from the group. However, it is difficult for me to grasp how responsible solutions are supposed to emanate from a group of irresponsible failures who have spent their lives violating the rights of others and acting contrary to their own long-term interest.

               

The program further emphasizes childhood trauma, societal injustice, and their impacts on offenders. Consider the following two exercises: Injunctions from childhood, the purpose of which is “To heighten awareness of how things that were said to us in childhood affect our lives”, [lxii] and Masks, the purpose of which is “To help surface the feelings that surround social discrimination of all sorts and to inform a discussion about the roots of violence /conflict that live in discrimination.”[lxiii]  These are clearly “insight oriented” exercises. And not only do they address noncriminogenic needs, but they also encourage offenders to blame factors outside themselves for their destructive behavior, rather than take responsibility for their choices. This last is particularly counterproductive. As many experts have pointed out, viewing themselves as victims provides criminals with a rationalization for their antisocial behavior.[lxiv]

               

Finally, instead of telling offenders that their behavior is immoral and indefensible, the program seeks to make them feel good about themselves, i.e., to raise their self-esteem. In AVPs opening talk, for instance, the Facilitators instruct the group that “Everyone is important and everyone is valuable,”[lxv] and “We look to affirm one another’s good points.”[lxvi]  The problem here, as numerous researchers have noted, is that raising an offender’s self-esteem without altering his character leaves you with a criminal who feels comfortable with his criminality.[lxvii]  I agree with those researchers who maintain that offenders need to be made to feel guilty, rather than good about themselves.[lxviii] The discomfort of guilt will presumably provide offenders with the necessary motivation to change.

               

As was mentioned above, eve evidence-based programs sometimes fail to reduce recidivism. The main reason this occurs is because the program is delivered with a lack of “therapeutic integrity”, which is the degree to which a program is implemented as it was intended to be.[lxix]  A lack of therapeutic integrity can occur for a variety of reasons, including inadequate training and a failure on the part of the correctional staff to “buy in” to the program, in order to assure therapeutic integrity, it is imperative that staff be well-trained and that the program be frequently monitored for quality control.

               

Whether it be from poor design or improper implementation, it is in my mind inexcusable that so many correctional programs fail to reform offenders. There now exists an abundance of available evidence for “what works.” It’s time to put theory into practice. Throughout the country we need to implement cognitive-behavioral programs that address the criminogenic needs of moderate- to high-risk offenders.

 

A brief note on education

               

While education has been shown to reduce recidivism, it has not been nearly as effective as the cognitive-behavioral programs discussed above.[lxx]  Still, I believe it can be a valuable adjunct to these programs. After all, the better educated they are, the more employable ex-offenders are likely to be. And if they are able to find employment, rehabilitative efforts have a better chance of succeeding. Thus, including vocational, general, and higher education in a plan to reduce crime, makes sense.

 

Widespread Implementation of Core Correctional Practices

 

Implementing evidence-based programs, while necessary, won’t be enough. This is because even the best programs have little chance of succeeding in correctional environments that are not conducive to offender reform. Whatever lessons offenders learn in their programs will be undermined by the dysfunctional milieus in which they live. Unfortunately, this is a far more common problem than you may think. Consider:  “… Anthony Flores and his colleagues (Flores, Russell, Latessa & Travis, 2005) asked 171 correctional practitioners to identify three criminogenic needs, none could.”[lxxi]  Given the importance of targeting criminogenic needs when trying to reform offenders, this is more than a little disheartening. And this refers to practitioners. Imagine how bad the case is for “front-line” staff!

 

Also, “Gendreau and Goggin (1997) report that only a minority of correctional agencies – perhaps as few as 1 in 10 – function in such a way as to satisfactorily deliver effective treatment programs.” They identified such problems as “… employing program directors and staff that have little professional training or knowledge about effective treatment programs; the failure to assess offenders with scientifically based actuarial risk instruments; the targeting of factors … for change that are weakly related or unrelated to recidivism; the use of treatments that were ‘inappropriate’ or delivered with insufficient ‘dosage’ or ‘intensity’; the failure to include aftercare in the treatment; and a general lack of therapeutic integrity.”[lxxii]

               

In our book, “Down the Rabbit Hole: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime”, Brent McCall and I identified several of these factors as well as others.  These include staff modeling inappropriate behavior, lending support to criminal values, not enforcing nor following the rules and rewarding bad behavior and punishing good behavior.

               

Overcoming these problems will require significant structural and cultural changes. This is a daunting task that will no doubt require herculean efforts to achieve. After all, those who benefit from the current system are unlikely to embrace the necessary changes. In the next section I’ll offer a suggestion of how to overcome the serious problem of entrenched interests. For now I’ll limit myself to discussing the types of correctional environments necessary to promote offender reform.

               

In order to facilitate positive changes in offenders, correctional environments must be punitive while at the same time providing them with the necessary tools for rehabilitation. Despite what many may believe, punishment and rehabilitation need not be antithetical to each other. In fact, employing one with the other is unlikely to make a dent in the recidivism rate.

               

Think about it. If they don’t face an unpleasant environment, what incentive do offenders have to put forth the arduous effort that reforming themselves requires? Of course, loss of liberty is itself a punishment, but if that loss results in living conditions where offenders can spend the lion’s share of their time watching TV, listening to the radio, playing video games, playing cards, etc., what effect is it likely to have? It is precisely the discomfort of punishment that will initially provide them with the motivation to change, and to participate in the types of programs that will help accomplish this.

               

However, punishing offenders will only teach them how not to behave. It won’t show them how to live responsibly. Furthermore, if the punishment is too harsh it will create resentments and a backlash, thus undermining reform efforts. The major challenge we thus face is how to create environments that are punitive enough to inspire change in a pro-social direction, while not being so punitive as to impede that aim.

               

Ultimately, what needs to be implemented in correctional institutions are behavior-management systems, the express goal being to turn offenders into responsible people. Social Learning Theory (SLT) provides the appropriate foundation for such systems.[lxxiii] According to SLT  “All behavior, criminal or not, is under the control of rewards and costs that come either prior to the behavior or after it. In any situation, the contingencies of rewards and costs are responsible for the acquisition, maintenance, and modification of human behavior.”[lxxiv]  Put simply, people tend to repeat the behaviors for which they are rewarded and discontinue those for which they are punished. Thus if criminals are to be reformed, they must experience a responsible lifestyle as rewarding and an antisocial lifestyle as punishing.

               

Also, SLT emphasizes that we learn from watching others. If we witness someone get rewarded for behaving in a certain way, we are likely to emulate them. On the other hand, if we see someone punished for how they conduct themselves, we are unlikely to employ the same behavior.[lxxv]  Importantly, the more a person is liked and respected, the more likely their behavior is to be copied.

               

The first step in implementing a behavior-management system will be to decide what rules to put in place. As it is criminal behavior we wish to alter, the rules we establish should reflect this fact.[lxxvi] In addition to banning behaviors that are explicitly criminal, such as fighting and extortion, for instance, behaviors indicative of criminality should be prohibited as well. A lack of consideration for how their behavior affects others, for example, is a common characteristic shared by offenders. Thus, expressions of this trait, such as yelling, slamming dominoes, cutting in line, etc., should be banned. On the other hand, bringing a bowl to chow, or tucking in one’s shirt, or giving a soup to a friend have nothing to do with one’s propensity to commit crimes, therefore rules prohibiting these actions make little sense. They also put undue stress on staff, whose time would be better spent focusing on more relevant behaviors.

               

In order to be effective change agents, correctional personnel need to understand and be able to recognize behaviors that are indicative of criminality. There are a number of good sources for obtaining this knowledge. I would recommend “The Criminal Personality”, a three-volume set by Doctor Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Samenow, “The Criminal Lifestyle” by Glenn Walters, and “The Psychology of Criminal Conduct” by James Bonta and D.A. Andrews.

               

Once the system is in place and staff have the requisite knowledge, they need to enforce the rules in a firm, fair and consistent manner. Consistency is absolutely vital. If rules are not consistently enforced, offenders will get the message that they can sometimes get away with behaving badly, which hey already believe. They are also likely to be confused about what’s expected of them. And if behavioral expectations are unclear, how will they know how to conduct themselves?

               

Punishments should be commensurate to the offense. Thus a week in “seg” for yelling would be inappropriate, as would an “informal” for fighting. Also, punishments should be administered as closely in time as possible to the offense, and the reason for the punishment clearly explained to the offender. Employing these two practices will help the offender to draw a clear connection between his actions and their consequences.

               

Furthermore, good behavior should never be punished, nor should the many be punished for the actions of the few. This may seem like common sense, but you’d be surprised how often they’ve occurred in the correctional settings in which I’ve been confined.

               

Finally, when a system of punishment is first instituted the inmates may rebel a bit. Remember, many of these people have never faced consistent consequences for how they behaved. It should therefore not be surprising that they should chafe when held accountable. The important thing is for the correctional agency to stay the course.[lxxvii]

               

As imperative as punishment is to a program of offender reform, it will not on its own result in significant improvements in offender behavior. They must be taught how to behave appropriately. This is where reinforcement comes into play. [lxxviii]

               

Whereas behaviors targeted by punishment tend to decrease, those targeted by reinforcement tend to increase. In layman’s terms, reinforcement is the rewarding of conduct. That reward may consist of giving someone something desirable (positive reinforcement), such as praise, better food, or more recreation; or it may be the removal of something unpleasant (negative reinforcement), such as being moved out of a lousy cell, or early release from confinement.

               

Reinforcements should be applied to the types of behaviors we wish to increase, i.e. pro-social, responsive actions. For example, offenders should be rewarded for showing consideration for others or demonstrating a good work ethic. As with punishment, to be effective reinforcement must be consistently employed and immediately follow the desired behavior.[lxxix]  While most people intuitively know that correctional staff should be looking out for rule violations, it is even more important that they search for pro-social behaviors to reward. This is because positive reinforcement is more effective than punishment when it comes to altering behavior. [lxxx]

               

Vitally, offenders shouldn’t be rewarded for bad behavior or for the good behavior of others.[lxxxi]  Examples I’ve seen of the former are cutting in line without consequence, showering when they are supposed to lock up, and keeping jobs they lied to obtain. An example I witnessed of the latter was everyone in an industries shop was given a commendation for the good work of one inmate.

               

While inconsistent and inappropriate applications of rewards and punishments are sure to subvert the type of system I’ve been describing, perhaps just as destructive is something far more common than it ought to be: staff who model irresponsible and sometimes downright criminal behavior. There are at least two ways in which these types of behaviors have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of behavior-management systems:

 

1)      They lend support to antisocial behavior by providing inmates with a rationalization for it. When criminals witness staff conducting themselves inappropriately, they may say something to themselves akin to “See, everybody’s a crook. I just had the misfortune of getting caught.”  This is not the message that should be sent to offenders.

 

2)      They lead to a credible charge of hypocrisy. Think about it. How likely is it that offenders are going to take seriously the admonitions of people who don’t follow the rules themselves? “Do what I say, not what I do” is a well-known poor parenting practice and it’s just as ineffective when trying to reform offenders.

 

 

The type of system described above is captured pretty well by the concept of “Core Correctional Practices”. This concept was originally developed by Andrews and Kiesling (1980) and consisted of five principles. In 1989, Andrews and Gendreau increased this amount.

 

 The following is the updated list:

 

1)      Anti-criminal modelling

 

2)      Effective reinforcement

 

3)      Effective disapproval

 

4)      Effective use of authority

 

5)      Problem solving

 

6)      Relationship skills

 

7)      Cognitive restructuring

 

8)      Skill building

 

9)      Motivational enhancement [lxxxii]

  

(For a full description, see attached)

               

As with programming, to be effective this scheme will require a significant amount of training, as well as frequent monitoring to ensure compliance. However, as important is these are, they are unlikely enough to achieve success. In order to achieve the results we want, we will need a fresh approach to overcome the aforementioned entrenched interests. Let’s see how it might be done.

 

Remunerate Correctional Officials and Employees Based on Results, i.e., Reduced Recidivism

               

This subject was discussed in detail in chapter 6, “Reforming the Reformers,” pgs. 329 –337, in “Down the Rabbit Hold: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime by Brent McCall and Michael Liebowitz (2017), a portion of which is quoted below.

 

 

“There aren’t very many occupations where the more an organization fails to achieve its overarching objective the more its employees stand to make. Corrections is one of them. As the system is presently designed, the earning potential of those who work in our nation’s prisons is tied directly to high prison populations and high rates of recidivism. And so long as that remains the case, society will continue to see the kind of abysmal results it has witnessed since the advent of the modern correctional era.

               

“Prison systems should be structured in a way that incentivizes reductions in recidivism. Presently they are not. Politicians and corrections officials may pay lip service to the importance of reducing the number of offenders returning to our nation’s prisons, but the fact is the system is set up in a way that encourages high prison populations.

               

“Whether prisons are operated by government officials or privately run, the incentive is to maintain or increase prison populations. Not only do substantial incarceration rates mean increased earnings for correctional officers and other rank and file institutional staff – who are beneficiaries of significant amounts of overtime - [but] private prisons get paid on a per inmate per diem basis. 83  So the more inmates they house, the higher the profits for shareholders. By contrast, lower recidivism means lower earnings for most of those directly involved, regardless of whether it is a publicly or privately-run institution.

               

“To be clear, we are not suggesting that high rates of recidivism are a consciously pursued goal on anyone’s part. We don’t see the problem as a nefarious conspiracy. To ascribe intention to any of this seems to us to grant too many people entirely too much credit. What we are saying is that people respond to the way in which things are incentivized, and teat the present arrangement is tantamount to disincentivizing the development or implementation of meaningful strategies to reduce the rate of recidivism. Stated a bit differently, the present design inadvertently rewards inaction. Simply put: When one is likely to make more money from doing nothing than he is from doing something – especially something as challenging as trying to motivate offenders to undertake the work necessary to change – it isn’t hard to guess which path he is going to take, i.e., the path of least resistance.

               

“In short, the policy of paying prison staff regardless of results breeds apathy. Imagine for a moment if car salesmen were paid even if they never sold any cars. How hard do you think they would work to make sales if they had job security and a steady income stream even though they didn’t get positive results? Well, when it comes to corrections, the practice is even worse because the arrangement actually promotes behaviors antithetical to the public interest. To pay prison staff regardless of the results they produce is ultimately to endanger public safety…

               

“High prison populations are obviously much easier to achieve than low ones. All the former requires is that institutional staff be uninterested in the behavior of offenders, unwilling to offer correctives or encouragement, unconcerned with how their own behaviors impacting the process, and uninvested in outcomes. The rest will, of course, take care of itself. Under these conditions, a correctional culture will more or less evolve that contributes to offenders coming in and out of prison unable to figure out how to break the pernicious cycle.

               

“Now that’s not to suggest that criminal offenders are casualties of correctional apathy. Criminals are always and only casualties of their own refusal to think. The choices they make are theirs and theirs alone. But that doesn’t mean that society would be justified in  throwing its hands up in the air and decrying that nothing works. Efforts should still be made to get through to criminal offenders and to provide them with the knowledge and guidance they need to effectuate positive changes. Glenn Walters put it this way: ‘Thus, while I am steadfast in my belief that offenders cannot legitimately use societal injustice as an excuse for their criminal actions, neither can we as a society realistically escape our responsibility by putting everything off on the offender.’84

               

“The only real way to change the correctional culture in a fundamental way is to change the way in which those who operate the system are compensated. Adding directives to the pile of directives already ignored will accomplish nothing at all levels, the incomes that DOC employees are capable of earning out to be tied directly to three primary goals. One, preventing escapes. Two, maintaining safety and security in the institutions. And three, reducing the rate of recidivism.

 

“Of course, linking employee remunerations to the attainment of an organization’s goals is not a radical idea. Indeed, it is how the vast majority of people earn their living, i.e., by producing positive results for their employers. In the private sector, employees who fail to contribute to their company’s bottom line soon find themselves out of a job. And by the same token companies that fail to turn a profit soon find themselves closing their doors. Applying private sector principles to the running of our nation’s prison is basically what we are recommending. The primary difference is that whereas the goal of private companies is to make profits, the goal of the DOC should be to reduce prison populations, and ultimately crime itself.

               

“Given that we advocate an incentive structure that is results-based in the way it is for private companies, it may be thought that we are advocating privatizing the prison system. Absolutely not; at least not based on the model of private prisons that currently exists. Under the present model, private prisons are perhaps even worse than those run by the state. {Remember, in the U.S., private prisons get paid based on how many prisoners they house]…

 

“Some studies have indicated that the way private prisons generate revenue has led to offenders housed in them serving even longer sentences than they would if they were housed in state-run institutions. For example, a study conducted by Anita Mukherjee, an assistant professor of actuarial science, risk management and insurance at the University of Wisconsin – Madison’s Wisconsin School of Business, found that ‘prisoners in private prisons are likely to serve as many as two to three more months behind bars than those assigned to public prisons.’ 85 And importantly, Mukherjee notes that ‘despite industry claims to lower recidivism rates,’ those housed in private prisons are ‘equally likely to commit more crime after release.’ 86

               

“According to Peter Kerwin, the longer prison terms served by those in private prisons are fueled by the ‘widespread use of prison conduct violations.’ 87  In summarizing, Mukherjee’s findings, Kerwin notes that ‘prisoners in every demographic, offense and sentence length category accumulated more infractions if they were assigned to a private prison.’ 88 On whole, inmates house in private prisons ‘received twice as many infractions as those in public prisons.’

 

Although the evidence suggests that the present American model  of prison privatization is a failure from the standpoint of reducing offender recidivism, Mukherjee states that ‘pay for performance’ contracts have met with some success in the United Kingdom.89  In other words, reductions in recidivism have been achieved among those inmates housed in private facilities paid on the basis of results.

               

“Ultimately, pay for performance is the basic model we are proposing. However, we are not suggesting that prisons have to be privatized in order to implement this format. There are a number of ways this format could work for government-run institutions. And although all the details would need to be eventually ironed out, the central issue is that the compensation structure would have to directly reward the men and women who work in prisons for positive results. Perhaps bonuses could be awarded over an employee’s base level pay for reductions in recidivism. The lower the rate, the higher the bonus. Additional vacation days might be earnable as well to help reduce employee burnout.

               

“Initially, this may sound expensive, but consider that ‘it is estimated that each chronic offender costs society about 1.3 million dollars over the course of the offender’s lifetime,’ 90 and that the U.S. presently spends $70 billion a year on corrections. 91 Certainly it makes sense, given the present state of affairs, to alter the way this money is allocated, if for no other reason than to reduce the human costs that are inevitably associated with unchanged offenders. In truth, however, changing the way the correctional workforce is compensated would likely save money as well as lives.

“What pay for performance necessarily would do is fundamentally alter the way prison employees approach their jobs, thus changing the prevailing correctional culture. The knowledge that the successful reform of inmates were tied directly to one’s personal earning potential would make correctional employees much more conscientious about how their actions or inactions might be impacting results. Accordingly, they would be more apt to be responsible and invested in the process …

               

“Of course, pay for performance would have its limitations. Given that a certain percentage of the offender population are incorrigible sociopaths, resistant to virtually all  correctional treatment, the rate of recidivism would bottom out somewhere well above zero. And this would need to be taken into account. The remuneration of correctional employees should not be adversely affected because recidivist rates could only be reduced so much. Which is to say, so long as recidivism continued to decline or remained at some yet-to-be-determined low point, those responsible for the low rates should be financially rewarded …

               

“[The idea of remuneration based on results is of course merely an inchoate recommendation.] There is much to work out, and many difficulties to overcome before [it] could be effectively implemented. And no doubt one of the main difficulties would be resistance from those with a vested interest in the status quo. The loudest protests would likely come from the correctional unions themselves. They will most certainly deride [this idea] as impractical, undoable, and implausible. But it seems to us those are adjectives that more accurately describe sustaining the present state of affairs.” (The forgoing quoted material is from “Down the Rabbit Hold: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime” (proof copy), Ch. 6 “Reforming the Reformers” pp 329 – 337 by Brent McCall and Michael Liebowitz (2017).)

               

Subsequent to the publication of “Down the Rabbit Hole”, while reading “Incarceration Nations” by Baz Dreisinger, I came across  “Serco”, a corporation based in Great Britain that runs two private prisons in Australia. (I would later discover that Serco has prisons in other countries as well). Contrary to America’s private prisons, however, Serco’s contracts include incentives to reduce recidivism. They are also cheaper to operate than government prisons.92

               

Given that McCall and I advocated this concept in our book, I was highly intrigued. This was especially so because Dreisinger, a critic of prisons who is perhaps particularly hostile to those which are privately run, seemed to reluctantly approve of Serco’s institutions. Among other things, she writes “Serco’s London-based think-tank arm presents a series of seemingly attractive arguments. Treating people more humanely ultimately costs less, and private prisons are more accountable than government-run prisons because contracts specify financial penalties for not meeting standards of health and educational services. Private prisons are cheaper, Serco claims, because of sound management, efficient staff levels, and flexible practices.”93 I had to find out more, so I had a friend get me some information about Serco off the internet.

 

The information with which my friend provided me came from two sources. The first was an article published by the Brennan Center for Justice,94 and the second was Serco’s official website. Like other sources I’ve seen, the Brennan article mentions how private prisons in the U.S. get paid more for housing more inmates, have roughly the same recidivist rates as government prisons, and don’t remunerate based on results.

 

The article notes that with Serco things are different. They award bonuses based on reductions in recidivism, and the author writes of a Serco-run prison in New Zealand. “Men who follow the rules, complete educational and vocational programs, and keep a positive attitude can move from the more traditional housing units into six-room cottages to prepare them for life outside prison.”

 

From Serco’s website I learned that in addition to Australia and New Zealand, Serco also “operate[s] six adult prisons (with a capacity to hold more than 5,400 prisoners) for the Ministry of Justice’s National Offender Management Service and the Scottish Prison Service. “They also claim to have had “outstanding successes in reducing prisoner reoffending,”95 although they don’t cite the numbers.

 

The website goes on to say that “By pursuing a rehabilitative approach to justice, with a focus on addressing individual criminogenic needs, all with the key outcome of reducing reoffending, we make offenders less likely to return to the criminal justice system, helping to rebuild lives, reduce demand on governments and lessen the financial and wider costs of crime to the communities we serve.”96

 

While the bulk of what I’ve read about Serco has been positive, it hasn’t all been so. For instance, a workers’ union has threatened to sue Serco over pay and conditions. There have been riots in Serco’s prisons, and an inspection by the Australian government claimed there was overcrowding and poorly trained staff. 97

 

Ultimately, I don’t know enough about Serco to determine whether its prison model is one I’d entirely endorse. However, despite the few instances of negative publicity noted above, the majority of what I’ve seen seems promising. At any rate, I am absolutely convinced that a prison system which remunerates based on results would be vastly superior to the one we have currently.

 

Privately Fund a Significant Portion of Reform Programs

 

I would like to see the bulk of the suggested offender reform programs – including education – privately financed. This could be done through charity, social impact bonds, or some combination of the two. Privately funded program will likely be cheaper, more effective , and would avoid the incessant debates about whether tax dollars should be spent in this manner.

 

The economist David Friedman asserted that anything done by government could be done in the private sector for half the cost.98  While I don’t know if anyone has ever tested this hypothesis, or if the ratio is exact, I do believe the principle is accurate. This is because when the government funds a project, those in charge of how the money gets spent know that the government can always get more via taxes. They thus have little incentive to monitor how much they’re spending, or how they could spend less and achieve the same result. On the other hand, private donors are likely to take a great interest in how efficiently their money is being spent. And given that they aren’t being forced to provide it, they are likely to stop doing so if it isn’t being spent wisely. Importantly, those making spending decisions know this, and are therefore incentivized to make as efficient use of the funds as they can.

 

Privately funded programs are likely to be more effective than those funded by the government for the same reason that  they’d be cheaper; namely, if the programs don’t achieve the results desired by the donors, those doors will likely discontinue funding them. In other words, privately funded programs are likely to be more effective because the financial managers of private programs will be held accountable by those paying their salaries.

 

Finally, since taxpayers not being compelled to pay for the programs, they’re unlikely to be concerned with how many are being provided. They will have little incentive to protest, petition their representatives, or otherwise complain. And absent pressure from their constituents, such representatives would have little reason to oppose the programs.



Core Correctional Practices

 

Anti-criminal Modeling – Staff serve as an anti-criminal model for offenders by engaging in pro-social behaviors and reinforcing them when they do the same.

 

Effective Reinforcement – Staff use effective reinforcement to reinforce a specific behavior that includes immediate statement of approval and support and the reasons why this behavior is desirable followed by consideration of the short-and-long-term benefits associated with continued use of the behavior.

 

Effective Disapproval – Staff use effective disapproval to communicate disapproval for a specific behavior that includes immediate statements of disapproval and the reasons why this behavior is undesirable followed by consideration of the short-and-long-term costs associated with continued use of the behavior and a clear demonstration of an alternate, pro-social behavior.

 

Effective Use of Authority – Staff make effective use of their authority by guiding offenders toward compliance, which includes focusing their message on the behavior exhibited, being direct and specific concerning their demands, and specifying the offender’s choices and attendant consequences.

 

Problem Solving – Problem solving is a specific social skill that is taught to offenders to address a variety of high-risk situations.

 

Relationship Skills – Effective staff possess several critical relationship skills including warm, open, non-judgmental, empathetic, flexible, engaging, solution-focused and directive.

 

Cognitive Restructuring – Staff need to help offenders understand the link between their thoughts and their behavior: What they think (e.g., attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs) affects how someone emotionally and behaviorally responds to a given situation, as opposed to situations directly dictating a person’s response.

 

Skill Building – In order for an offender to learn ways to behave, staff need to teach and proactive new skills with offenders. There are cognitive skills (e.g., how well people solve problems, experience empathy toward others, and rationally assess situations ) that affect how a person behaves.

 

Motivational Enhancement -  Effective staff help motivate offenders to change by increasing intrinsic motivation (getting them to want to change). Techniques include motivational interviewing, weighing the pros and cons, and goal setting.

 

Taken from “What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism”, p. 64, by Edward J. Latessa, Shelley J. Listwan and Deborah Koetzle, (2015)

 ____________________________


Notes


[1]  All the preceding historical information was taken from Friedman, Lawrence M., Crime & Punishment in American History (1993).
[1]  Branson, Sam., Ending the War on Drugs p. 185 (2016). (Book is by various authors).
[1]  ibid p. 5, Branson, Richard.
[1]  ibid, p. 17 (no author named).
[1]  ibid, p. 13 (no author named).
[1]  ibid p. 30, Zedillo, Ernesto,
[1]  ibid p. 7, Branson, Richard.
[1]  Friedman, Lawrence M., Crime & Punishment in American History, p. 357 (1993).
[1] Walsh, Anthony, Criminology: The Essentials, pp. 26 - 27 (2012).
[1] Zedillo, Ernesto, Ending the War on Drugs, p. 27 (2016).
[1] Walsh, Anthony, Criminology: The Essentials, p. 228, citing McBride & McCoy, 1993; Menard, Mihalic,& Huizinga 2001. (2012).
[1] ibid, pp. 225 – 226.
[1] ibid, citing Parker & Auerhahn, 1998.
[1]  ibid, pp. 224 – 225.
[1]  ibid, p. 218, citing m. Robinson, 2005.
[1]  Clegg, Nick, Ending the War on Drugs, pp. 154 – 155 (2016).
[1]  ibid, p. 116, Gaviria, César.
[1]  ibid, p. 130, Obasanjo, Olusegun.
[1] ibid, p. 165, Bém, Pavel.
[1] ibid, p. 166.
[1] ibid, p. 167.
[1] ibid, p. 7, Branson, Richard.
[1] ibid, p. 115, Gaviria, César.
[1] ibid, p. 116.
[1] ibid, p. 8, Branson, Richard.
[1] ibid, p. 30, Zedillo, Ernesto.
[1] Hollin, Clive R., editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 79 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit, Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Washington State Institute for Public Policy (2018).
[1] Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 211 (2014)
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 140 (2017)
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 82 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit, Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] ibid, p. 83
[1] Washington State Institute for Public Policy (2018).
[1] Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 211 (2014).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 87 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit, Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 142 (2017).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 87 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit, Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 142 (2017).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 88 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit, Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 143 (2017).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000), DSST Criminal Justice Exam Secrets (2014) by Mometrix Media, and Freidman, Lawrence M. Crime and Punishment in American History, pp. 79, 80, 81 (1993).
[1] Freidman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in American History, p. 160 (1993).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000), and Freidman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in American History, p. 304 (1993).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000),
[1] ibid, citing Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975).
[1] ibid
[1] ibid, Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, (2017), and Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J, and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism (2015).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 233 (2017).
[1] ibid, p. 175.
[1] ibid.
[1] ibid, p. 176.
53 ibid, p. 180.
54 ibid, pp. 44, 46, 180.
55 Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000),
56 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, pp. 256 – 257, (2017).
57 Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 5, pp. 64 – 65 by Robinson, David and Porpino, Frank J. (2004).
58 ibid, p. 67
59 ibid, pp. 68 -69.
60 ibid, pp. 71 – 72.
61 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 47 (2017) and Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J., and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, pp. 95 – 96 2015).
62 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 235 (2017).
63 Alternatives to Violence Project, Advanced Manual (2005).
64 ibid.
65 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 127 citing Sykes and Matza, 1957 (2017), Walters, Glenn, The Criminal Lifestyle, p. 131 (1990), and Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal Personality Vol. l, p. 366 (1993).
66 Alternatives to Violence Project, Basic Manual, p. A – 11 (2002).
67 ibid.
68 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 91 (2015) and Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal Personality Vol. ll, pp. 299 – 300 (2004).
69 Halgin, Richard and Krauss Whitbourne, Susan, Abnormal Psychology, p. 318 (2007), Walters, Glenn, The Criminal Lifestyle, p. 173 (1990), and Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal Personality Vol. ll, p. 36, (2004).
70 Cullen, Francis T and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects (2000),  and Bonta, James and Andrews, D. A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 247 (2017).
71 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 146 (2017), and Latessa, Edward J. Listwan, Shelley J., and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 195 (2015).
72 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, pp. 349 - 350 (2017).
73 Cullen, Francis T. and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects (2000).
74 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 66 (2015).
75 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 49 (2017).
76 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 67 (2015).
77 ibid, p. 78
78 ibid, p. 75
79 ibid, p. 75.
80 ibid, p. 69.
81 ibid, p. 76.
82 ibid, pp. 63 – 64.
83 McCall, Brent, and Liebowitz, Michael, Down the Rabbit Hole: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime (Proof copy), Footnote 353, from the August 2015 issue of Prison Legal News, p. 43 (2017).
84 ibid, Footnote 354, from Walters, Glenn, The Criminal Lifestyle, p. 178 (1990).
85 ibid, Footnote 358, from the January 16, 2016 issue of Prison Legal News, p. 26.
86 ibid, Footnote 358, ibid.
87 ibid, Footnote 360, ibid, p. 27
88 ibid, Footnote 361, ibid.
89 ibid, Footnote 362, “Mukherjee’s research ‘Do Private Prisons Distort Justice? Evidence of Time Served and Recidivism’, is available on the Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com”.
90 ibid, Footnote 363, from Bartol, Curt and Bartol, Ann, Current Perspectives in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Justice, p. 7 (2006).
91 ibid, Footnote 364, from the August 2015 issue of Prison Legal News, p. 34
92 Dreisinger, Baz, Incarceration Nations, p. 210 (2016).
93 ibid, p. 211.
94 Eisen, Lauren-Brooke, How to Create More Humane Private Prisons, November 14, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org.
95 https://www.serco.com/uk/sector-expertise/justice. See Full Prison Management.
96 ibid
97 Dreisinger, Baz, Incarceration Nations p. 222 (2016).
98 Friedman, David, The Machinery of Freedom, Third Edition

  

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But I had it first, Don! :) http://www.middletowninsider.com/2020/04/from-behind-bars-ending-mass.html

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