Michael
Liebowitz, along with Brent McCall, is the coauthor of “Down The Rabbit Hole”,
reviewed in February 2018 by Connecticut Commentary. Much has been
written about reforming Connecticut prisons over the past two decades, most of
it by academics and blabologists who have never seen the inside of a prison.
I’ve known Michael, through the word only, for a few years; prisons are much
harder to break into than out of, and so are prisoners. It is good for the
general public to see the institutions they have created from the inside. The
words that best describes everything that falls out of Liebowitz’s mind are
“thoughtful” and even “scholarly,” as the reader will notice if he or she has
the patience to lend Michael an ear. He is, after a couple of decades in
prison, deeply analytical and grateful.
Ending Mass Incarceration
By Michael Liebowitz
Introduction
I would argue that, strictly
speaking, ending mass incarceration per se should not be the goal. Rather, what
we ought to seek to accomplish is a significant reduction of criminal behavior.
After all, if we simply set out to eliminate mass incarceration as our primary
goal, it would be simple enough to achieve; just open the prison gates and
release the bulk of the prison population. I highly doubt, however , that this
“solution” would be palatable to the general public.
The questions are: Are there
policies we can implement that ill dramatically reduce crime? And if so, what
are they? I firmly believe the answer to the first question is yes, and the
purpose of this plan is to articulate and propose such policies. Crime
reduction will undoubtedly require a bold and comprehensive plan. And while due
to my lack of resources I am unable to provide all the details I would like
(such as cost, for example), I still think my plan meets these criteria.
It consists of the following:
· End
the War on Drugs
· Widespread
Implementation of Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic
· Therapy
(MST); Hold Juveniles Accountable
· Widespread
Implementation of Evidence-Based Programs
· Widespread
Implementation of Core Correctional Practices
· Remunerate
Correctional Officials and Employees Based on Results, i.e., Reduced Recidivism
· Privately
Fund a Significant Portion of Reform Programs
Let’s examine each of the plan’s
components in turn.
End the War on Drugs
I argued above that our primary
goal ought not to be to end mass incarceration, but to reduce crime. I pointed
out the ease with which we could shrink the prison population by releasing
prisoners en masse, but that the public would likely see this as undesirable.
There is one type of offender, however, who should be released, and one type of
crime that should be removed from the book: drug offenders and drug offenses.
These two reforms would by themselves significantly reduce the prison
population. Ending the “war on drugs”, however, would not only do this, but it
would also reduce crime, and not just crimes related to sales and possession.
While there are both ethical and
constitutional reasons to end this war, here I’m going to limit myself to a
pragmatic, i.e., consequentialist argument. Before getting to that, however,
let’s take a look at the history of the drug war and some of the reasons for
its commencement.
Surprising as it may seem to
some, drugs were perfectly legal for a large portion of this country’s history.
Although considered “evil” and “immoral”, their sale and consumption
did not become object of prohibition until the late 1800’s. Even then, however,
it was only some states, not the Federal government, that banned them. The federal
prohibition would have to wait until the 20th century.
So, what changed? For starters,
the late 1800’s were marked by high degrees of moralism and religiosity, with
many calls for “vice” laws aimed at such “immoral” behaviors as gambling and
prostitution. This was also a period of rapid change in society, characterized
by large waves of immigrants and the development of big cities. These changes
led to a predictable backlash from traditionalists wishing to maintain the
status quo, and part of this backlash involved the implementation of drug laws.
Also, one must not underestimate the racial impetus for these laws. There was a
widespread fear of Chinese opium dens, while later on cocaine was associated in
the public mind with African Americans and marijuana with African Americans and
Mexicans. Noticeably absent from these reasons is any evidence that society was
in great danger from these substances.
The Federal government’s first
major foray into drug interdiction came in 1914 with the passage of the
Harrison Act. Ostensibly a tax law, its real purpose was to end the drug trade.
It applied to both opium and coca leaves, as well as their derivatives. But it
was ultimately the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Harrison Act in Webb
v. united Stated (1919) that made drug use a crime, and from then on linked the
Federal government to drug laws.
Webb was a doctor who prescribed
morphine to addicts in order to prevent them from experiencing withdrawal. This
was a practice, the Court ruled, that Harrison did not allow. This may be
looked at as the second major shot in what would become the war on drugs.
Next came the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, which was established in response to the widely held false belief
that drug use caused widespread criminal behavior. Then in 1961 the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs set forth the idea that drugs posed a threat to
humanity. Following this, in 1971, President Nixon declared a war on drugs.
With the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1971, the drug war became a
permanent fixture of American life. [1]
So what have been the
consequences of this war? Consider the following:
· More
than a trillion dollars have been spent. [2]
· $100
billion a year is spent fighting this war, but supply, production and use have
not diminished. [3]
· The
U.S. alone spends $51 billion a year. [4]
· The
U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world. [5]
· Almost
500,000 people are serving time for drug offense in the U.S. [6]
· Prohibition
has led to contaminated drugs and no way to know the strength of those drugs. [7]
As Lawrence M. Friedman wrote in
“Crime and Punishment in American History”, “The prisons are jammed top to
bottom with men and women convicted under drug laws. Is this really the only
way? [8] I don’t think so.
Ending the war on drugs will
likely lead to a substantial reduction the crime rate. If drugs were completely
legalized, “crimes” such as sale and possession would be immediately
eliminated. Also, the end of prohibition will lead to a large reduction in the
price of these substances, thus crimes committed to finance expensive habits crimes
such as robbery and larceny, for instance, will be rendered almost entirely
unnecessary.
In my view the most serious
crimes associated with the drug war are those that result from the competition
for control of the all-too-lucrative black markets. From bosses of
international cartels to low-level gang members, a wide variety of criminals
have taken part in these battles. Who knows how many people have been
assaulted, robbed, kidnapped, shot or killed as a consequence. And how many of
those were innocent bystanders, “collateral damage” of this war? While ending
the drug war will undoubtedly diminish these types of crimes, I wish I could be
confident a more robust reduction. The reason I’m not is because I think it
unlikely that those who currently profit from the drug trade will suddenly get
nine-to-five jobs once it is no longer an option. It seems more reasonable to
suspect that they’ll find or create new illicit ways to make money. After all,
the Mafia didn’t retire with the end of alcohol prohibition. Nonetheless, as
we’ll see, there is some historical evidence (also from alcohol prohibition)
that ending the drug war will cause a large drop in violence.
It should also be noted that when
freed from having to pursue petty criminals, dealers, and addicts, police will
be able to focus their efforts on more serious offenders. This is likely to put
a sizable dent in the crime rate in addition to those already mentioned.
In our country’s history, the
closest analogy we have to the drug war is unquestionably alcohol prohibition.
In 1919 Congress ratified the 18th amendment and the passed the
Volstead Act, outlawing the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the U.S. With
this prohibition came a high-crime era with gangs fighting over the illegal
alcohol markets. Volstead was passed because people believed, correctly, that
alcohol influenced violent behavior. However, it soon became obvious to most
people that the “cure” was worse than the disease. (In a like manner, while
drugs can certainly be harmful, outlawing them has caused more problems than
does their use.)
Acknowledging prohibition’s
dismal failure, in 1933 Congress repealed the 18th amendment
and the Volstead Act. Did the world come to an end? Were there dire
consequences? No, but there was at least one positive outcome. Criminologist
Anthony Walsh notes “The homicide rate started a steep climb after the Volstead
Act … was passed in 1920 (sic) as gangs fought over the lucrative alcohol
market. The rate started to fall with the repeal of the Volstead Act in 1933
which effectively removed criminals from the alcohol business”. [9]
Why haven’t we learned from
history? Why has the war on drugs lasted so long, with apparently no end in
sight? I believe this has more to do with some misconceptions about drugs than
it does with actual evidence. Let’s examine several of these misconceptions.
Drug use causes
crime
In 1961 the American Medical
Association and the American Bar Association issued a report in which they
concluded that the psychological and physical addiction to drugs, combined with
the high cost of those drugs, is what leads to crime, not drugs
themselves. [10] Also, numerous studies
have shown that drug use does not cause crime, although it may lead to the
commission of more serious crimes by those already living a criminal
lifestyle. [11] I don’t think it’s a
stretch to assume that a predominant reason drug use results in criminals
engaging in more serious illegal activity is the high costs of those drugs
resulting from their illegal status.
Drug use causes violence
According to Anthony Walsh, there
are three types of violence linked to illicit drugs: systemic, economic –
compulsive, and pharmacological. [12]
Systemic violence results from
competition between rivals for the drug trade. Think cartels and gang violence.
Economic – compulsive violence is
committed by addict to support their very expensive habits. A robbery committed
to obtain drug money would be an example.
Pharmacological violence results
from the properties of the drugs themselves. In other words, simply ingesting
the drugs makes it more likely that someone will become violent.
The first two types of violence
are a result of prohibition, not an argument for it. As for pharmacological
violence, while not impossible it is rare. In fact, alcohol, a legal drug, is
far more associated with violence than are illegal drugs. [13]
Drugs have
harmful effects, such as addiction and overdoses.
Addiction is a serious problem,
but most people who try psychoactive drugs do not become addicted to
them. [14] There is simply no reason to
suspect this would change if these substances were legalized.
As for overdoses, they are far
more likely under a regime of prohibition than if drugs were legal. This is
because at present a person has no reliable means of knowing the potency of the
drugs she’s buying, nor whether the drugs bought have been “cut” with
contaminants. If drugs were purchased legally, however, both the
potency and ingredients would be listed on the package. Furthermore, although
undoubtedly partially due to the fact that more people drink than use drugs,
there are more deaths per year related to alcohol use that there are related to
drug use, with 110,000 and 19,000 respectively. [15] Yet
we don’t see too many people clamoring for a “war on alcohol”.
Use will
dramatically increase
While
I cannot prove this will not occur, the available evidence suggests it will
not.
Consider:
· Countries
that have decriminalized marijuana use have not seen large increase in
prevalence.[16]
· Many
Western European countries have liberalized their drug policies, yet
consumption has not dramatically increased. [17]
· The
U.K. government conducted a literature review of the approaches of other
countries to drugs. They found “there is no apparent correlation between the
‘toughness’ of a country’s approach and the prevalence of … drug use.’” [18]
· In
the early 1990’s the Czech Republic decriminalized drug use. Then in 1998 they
recriminalized possession for use. Advocates of this move believed it would
reduce the availability and use of drugs. Shortly thereafter “… the Czech
government decided to launch a scientific evaluation of the new drug law… The
ultimate goal was to measure the expected benefits and to explore potential
unintended negative impacts.” [19] The
evaluation showed that the new policy had no deterrent effect on problem users.
The number of users actually increased. [20]
Many countries have given up
their wars on drugs, instead initiating harm – reduction policies such as
syringe exchanges, drug substitution , and decriminalizing personal use. And
the Czechs notwithstanding, most of those countries have not returned to their
previous policies (even the Czechs reinstituted decriminalization in
2010). [21]
Consider Portugal, which “…
decriminalized all drug use in 2001, investing instead in public health
services for people who use drugs. This has resulted in some very positive
outcome, such as massive reductions in drug-related deaths and tumbling rates of
HIV and hepatitis infections.” [22]
It is clear to me that the war of
drugs must end. And surprisingly, to me at least, this is a somewhat common
conclusion:
America’s approach to drug policy
is disapproved of by 70% of U.S. citizens. [23]
Over half of U.S. citizens favor
the legalization of marijuana. [24]
“… nine UN agencies have so far
called for an end to the war on drugs.” [25]
In 2014 the Global Commission on
Drug Policy recommended the decriminalization of drug use and possession and
“experiments” in legalization of illicit drugs. [26]
So the war on drugs should end,
but then what? While personally I believe that full legalization is the best
way to go, it is certainly not the only available option. For instance,
possession and use can be decriminalized, penalties can be reduced, mandated
treatment can replace prison, and investment can be made in education and
prevention. Certainly, all of these possibilities are better than what we have
currently: A failed drug war that has led to violence , mass incarceration and
broken families in our country and around the world.
Widespread implementation of
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic Therapy (MST); Hold Juveniles
Accountable
Perhaps the best way to reduce
crime is to intervene in the lives of at-risk and delinquent youths to prevent
them from becoming full-blown adult criminals. Fortunately, there are two
cost-effective programs that have been shown to reduce juvenile delinquency:
FFT and MST. Let’s look at each of these.
There is an abundance of evidence
which indicates that familial relationships have a significant effect on both
the formation and continuance of juvenile delinquency. [27] Thus,
if the goal is to reduce such delinquency, it makes sense to target the entire family
for intervention. This is precisely what FFT does.
“[FFT] … is a structured
family-based intervention that uses a multi-step approach to enhance protective
factors and reduce risk factors in the family.” [28] Addressed
to medium-risk youths between 10 and 18 and their families, [29] it attempts to change the way family
members communicate with one another, and thereby improve relationships within
the family. [30] The FFT therapist
seeks to identify the “functions” the youth’s antisocial behaviors serve as
well as the functions the other family members’ problem behaviors serve and
attempts to show them how to satisfy these needs/wants with more productive
behaviors. [31]
FFT employs an eclectic approach
consisting of techniques taken from behavioral and cognitive behavioral
therapy, as well as family systems approaches. [32] It
lasts between three and five months and consists of 12 to 14 visits. It is
highly cost-effective at $3,531 per participant, with an anticipated benefit of
$27,844. Thus, benefits minus costs equal $24,313 per participant, with a 96%
chance that benefits will exceed costs. [33] For
more information, see attached.
Created in the 1970s, MST is an
intense program for youths ages 12 – 17 who have severe behavioral
problems. [34] The theoretical roots of
the program are social, ecological and pragmatic family systems theories.
At-risk youths are seen as belonging to numerous interconnected “systems” that
exhibit a reciprocal influence on one another. These systems include the youth’s
family, friends, school and community. “ … youth behavior problems are viewed
as maintained by problematic transactions within and/or between any one or
combination of these systems.”[35] All of
these areas serve as targets for interventions.
As a part of MST, therapists
basically embed themselves within the family, allowing them to see how family
members interact with each other. Particularly important is for therapists to
mark the strengths the family already has. These strengths can then be built
upon to improve family interactions. [36]
An evidence-based program, MST
addresses factors known to influence antisocial behavior in youths. Therapists
provide individual and family counseling, implementing strategies from
pragmatic, problem-focused, cognitive-behavioral, and family systems approaches.
Interventions take place in the homes and communities of the youths and
typically last between three and five months. [37] Among
the goals of MST are to get kids to distance themselves from antisocial peers
and activities, replace them with their pro-social counterparts, and to teach
parents to employ more effective disciplinary strategies that make better use
of rewards and punishments. [38]
In randomized trials, MST has
been shown to reduce rearrests over the long term.[39] It
has been effective with serious felony offenders, including drug, violent, and
sex offenders. Gains from treatment have been demonstrated to be intact after
13 years following an intervention.[40] It
costs $7,933 per participant and produces benefits of $14,134, for benefits
minus costs equaling $6,161. The chances that benefits will exceed costs are
76%.
Of course, these programs don’t
operate in a vacuum. They take place in a context in which juveniles know
whether further misbehavior will result in adverse consequences for themselves.
It is therefore imperative that there be the potential for such consequences
otherwise the youths will have no real incentive to change. I know that many of
you probably believe the incentive already exists, in the form of the rewards a
pro-social life has to offer. It’s important to keep in mind, however, that all
behavior, delinquent and pro-social alike, “works” on some level for the person
engaging in it. The value structures of delinquents are such that they already
find their way of life rewarding; the only way they’ll be willing to engage in
the herculean effort that reform requires is if their cost-benefit assessment
changes. And the only way this can happen is if they are made aware of the real
possibility of punishment.
These punishments should be
graduated. Perhaps they could begin with grounding moving up to community
service, probation , house arrest, and in the case of serious of repeat
offenders, a period of incarceration. If incarceration does become necessary it
should take place in an environment where staff enforce the rules in
a firm, fair and consistent manner, rewarding good conduct and punishing bad.
The kids should be required to attend school and participate in programs proven
to reduce recidivism, such as Aggression Replacement Training (see attached).
I firmly believe that
implementing FFT and MST on a large scale and holding juveniles accountable for
their actions will greatly reduce juvenile crime. Perhaps more importantly, we
will remove many kids from the path leading to a criminal career and instead
place them on one leading to happy, productive lives.
Widespread Implementation of
Evidence - Based Programs
Before delving into what I mean
by “evidence – based programs”, I think it will be helpful first to briefly
discuss the history of the idea that one of the purposes of prisons is to
rehabilitate offenders.
The penitentiary system was
created in the late 18th century and came into prominence in
the 19th. From the beginning it was supposed that among the goals of
incarceration was that of reforming the characters of criminals. Whether
through the “silent system” at New York’s Auburn prison, or the “separate
system” at Pennsylvania’s Cherry Hill prison, it was thought that removing
offenders from society, making them labor intensively , and teaching them
religion would get them to atone for their sins and alter their evil ways.[41]
By late in the 19th century
it became clear that this model was failing, and changes were soon enacted.
Labor and religion were still very much part of the prison experience, but new
reforms, such as the indeterminate sentence, were added to the mix. While never
fully implemented in practice, the idea of the indeterminate sentence was that
there would be no specified period of time to which criminals would be
sentenced. Instead, they would be released when their actions demonstrated that
they were ready for society this was thought to provide offenders with the
necessary incentive to reform themselves.[42]
Parole, probation, vocational
education and rehabilitation programs developed in the early 20th century,
making up what came to be known as the “rehabilitative ideal.” [43] Then in 1954 the American prison Association
became the American Correctional Association and prisons became “correctional
institutions.” [44]
After approximately 70 years as
the dominant idea in criminal justice, the rehabilitative ideal fell into
disrepute. The 1960s and 70s were turbulent times characterized by
several high-profile assassinations, war, protests, and rising crime rates.
Many people lost faith in society’s ability to reform offenders. A perfect
storm was in place for what was perhaps the most significant blow against the
rehabilitative ideal: Robert Martinson’s “nothing works” report.
In 1974 Martinson and his
colleagues released the results of a study they had conducted in which they
concluded that, by and large, nothing works to reform offenders.[45] This conclusion soon assumed the status of dogma,
a dogma that has been difficult to shake. Never mind the serious methodological
weaknesses in the study; never mind the numerous studies that have shown the
“nothing works” position to be erroneous; and never mind that prior to his
death, Martinson himself partially reconsidered. The verdict was in: criminals
were incorrigible. [46]
What does the evidence actually
indicate? A plethora of studies have shown that certain types of programs, when
implemented properly, lead to significant reductions in recidivism.[47] One such study, or rather a meta-analysis
of studies, has been expanded to include 225 studies yielding 374 tests of how
judicial and correctional interventions impacted recidivism.[48] Comparisons
of these interventions were based on whether they adhered to 0, 1, 2, or 3
hypothesized effective principles of rehabilitation. The results were as
follows: Criminal sanctions and inappropriate human service increased
recidivism by two percentage points; human service adhering to one principle
reduced recidivism by two points; human service consistent with two principles
decreased recidivism by 18 points; and when adhering to all three
principles, human service reduced recidivism by 26 points. These results are
undoubtedly impressive, but what exactly are these effective principles of
rehabilitation? Answering this question is where I’ll now turn.
The model that informs effective
correctional practices is the Risk, Need, Responsivity Model of Offender
Assessment and Treatment. “By the late 1980s it was becoming clear that
treatment could be effective in reducing offender recidivism, but it was
unclear why some treatments were more effective than others. When reviewing the
offender rehabilitation literature, D. A. Andrews, James Bonta and Robert Hoge
(1990) observed certain patterns associated with the more effective treatment
programs. They formulated three general principles for purposes of effective
classification and correctional treatment: the (1) risk, (2) need, and (3)
responsivity principles …”[49] Although
other principles have since been added to the model, these three still make up
its core.[50]
According to the risk principle,
programs will be most effective at reducing recidivism when addressed to
moderate-to-high risk offenders. Also, the intensity of an intervention should
match the risk level of the participants. Finally, it’s generally undesirable
to mix high- and low-risk offenders together. [51] The
RNR model identifies eight central risk factors: 1) Criminal history; 2)
Pro-criminal attitudes; 3) Pro-criminal associates; 4) Antisocial personality
pattern; 5) Family / marital; 6) School / work; 7) Substance abuse; 8) Leisure
/ recreation. [52]
The need principle posits that
the factors most associated with criminal behavior are the ones that should be
targeted for intervention. Perhaps you have noticed that of
the above risk factors, only one (criminal history) is
unchangeable or “static”. The rest are changeable or “dynamic”. The
seven dynamic risk factors are called “criminogenic needs”. Not only are these
alterable, but they are the “factors most associated with criminal behavior.”
These two characteristics make them appropriate for interventions. [53]
The responsivity principle is
that interventions need to be appropriate to the characteristics of offenders.
Two types of responsivity are encompassed by this principle, specific and
general. Specific responsivity refers to the idea that interventions should be
adapted to factors unique to the individual, such as age, gender and
personality, for instance. General responsivity means that certain types of
programs have been more effective than others in treating offenders.
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
addressed to criminogenic needs has been especially successful at reforming
offenders. Among the characteristics of these programs is that therapists model
pro-social behavior, participants engage in role playing to practice acting
appropriately, and offenders learn cognitive restructuring. In this last, the
therapist teaches the offender to identify his antisocial and irresponsible
attitudes, values and beliefs and eliminate and replace them with their
pro-social and responsible counterparts.[54] Of
particular importance is that offenders learn to take personal responsibility
for their lives. It’s up to them to reform themselves and to maintain positive
changes once they’ve been achieved. The offenders need to understand that no
one can do this for them, and they owe it to themselves to try.[55]
An example of a program that fits
the description “evidence-based” is the Reasoning & Rehabilitation
(R&R) program created by Robert Ross. As part of the curriculum, group
leaders instruct offenders how to replace deeply rooted antisocial thinking
patterns with those pro-social in nature. The leaders also model pro-social
behaviors so as to demonstrate to offenders what those behaviors look like in
practice.[lvi] R&R makes use of
line-level correctional employees, the idea being that their participation has
the benefit of getting them to buy-in to the program and become invested in the
outcomes.[lvii]
In a study conducted in 1988 by
Ross and others, R&R was compared with a “life skills” program and
regular probationers. Only 18.1% or R&R participants recidivated,
compared to 47.5% of those who took the life skills program and 69.5% of the
regular probationers. [lviii]
A 1995 study by Porpino and
Robinson found that R&R had its greatest benefit when conducted in the
community. “A 66.3% reduction in new convictions was observed for offenders
treated in the community compared with a 16.23% reduction among those from
institutional programs.”[lix]
Almost as important as knowing
what to do is knowing what not to do. When it comes to rehabilitation programs,
not all are created equal. Not all programs reduce recidivism, and some
actually increase it. Moreover, even evidence-based programs sometimes fail to
achieve positive results. So what are the types of programs that are
ineffective? And why do good ones sometimes miss the mark? Let’s see.
Ineffective approaches to
treating offenders include client-centered, non-directive techniques;
psychodynamic and insight-oriented methods; bibliotherapy and those that target
non-criminogenic needs such as self-esteem and anxiety.[lx] This
last is vital. In order to be effective, programs must target criminogenic
needs. In fact, those that spend the bulk of their time addressing
noncriminogenic needs have been shown to increase, rather than reduce,
recidivism. [lxi]
Unfortunately, in my 22 years of
incarceration the vast majority of programs in which I’ve participated fit the
criteria of ineffective approaches. Consider, for example, the Alternatives to
Violence Project (AVP). The AVP facilitators’ manual describes the program as
experiential, i.e., nondirective. Rather than directly teach offenders how to
identify and alter their criminal thinking patterns, the program emphasizes
that “solutions” will come from the group. However, it is difficult for me to
grasp how responsible solutions are supposed to emanate from a group of
irresponsible failures who have spent their lives violating the rights of
others and acting contrary to their own long-term interest.
The program further emphasizes
childhood trauma, societal injustice, and their impacts on offenders. Consider
the following two exercises: Injunctions from childhood, the purpose of which
is “To heighten awareness of how things that were said to us in childhood
affect our lives”, [lxii] and Masks, the
purpose of which is “To help surface the feelings that surround social
discrimination of all sorts and to inform a discussion about the roots of
violence /conflict that live in discrimination.”[lxiii] These
are clearly “insight oriented” exercises. And not only do they address
noncriminogenic needs, but they also encourage offenders to blame factors
outside themselves for their destructive behavior, rather than take
responsibility for their choices. This last is particularly counterproductive.
As many experts have pointed out, viewing themselves as victims provides
criminals with a rationalization for their antisocial behavior.[lxiv]
Finally, instead of telling
offenders that their behavior is immoral and indefensible, the program seeks to
make them feel good about themselves, i.e., to raise their self-esteem. In AVPs
opening talk, for instance, the Facilitators instruct the group that “Everyone
is important and everyone is valuable,”[lxv] and
“We look to affirm one another’s good points.”[lxvi] The
problem here, as numerous researchers have noted, is that raising an offender’s
self-esteem without altering his character leaves you with a criminal who feels
comfortable with his criminality.[lxvii] I
agree with those researchers who maintain that offenders need to be made to
feel guilty, rather than good about themselves.[lxviii] The
discomfort of guilt will presumably provide offenders with the necessary
motivation to change.
As was mentioned above, eve
evidence-based programs sometimes fail to reduce recidivism. The main reason
this occurs is because the program is delivered with a lack of “therapeutic
integrity”, which is the degree to which a program is implemented as it was
intended to be.[lxix] A lack of therapeutic
integrity can occur for a variety of reasons, including inadequate training and
a failure on the part of the correctional staff to “buy in” to the program, in
order to assure therapeutic integrity, it is imperative that staff be
well-trained and that the program be frequently monitored for quality control.
Whether it be from poor design or
improper implementation, it is in my mind inexcusable that so many correctional
programs fail to reform offenders. There now exists an abundance of available
evidence for “what works.” It’s time to put theory into practice. Throughout
the country we need to implement cognitive-behavioral programs that address the
criminogenic needs of moderate- to high-risk offenders.
A brief note on education
While education has been shown to
reduce recidivism, it has not been nearly as effective as the
cognitive-behavioral programs discussed above.[lxx] Still,
I believe it can be a valuable adjunct to these programs. After all, the better
educated they are, the more employable ex-offenders are likely to be. And if
they are able to find employment, rehabilitative efforts have a better chance
of succeeding. Thus, including vocational, general, and higher education in a
plan to reduce crime, makes sense.
Widespread Implementation of Core
Correctional Practices
Implementing evidence-based
programs, while necessary, won’t be enough. This is because even the best
programs have little chance of succeeding in correctional environments that are
not conducive to offender reform. Whatever lessons offenders learn in their
programs will be undermined by the dysfunctional milieus in which they live.
Unfortunately, this is a far more common problem than you may think.
Consider: “… Anthony Flores and his colleagues (Flores, Russell,
Latessa & Travis, 2005) asked 171 correctional practitioners to
identify three criminogenic needs, none could.”[lxxi] Given
the importance of targeting criminogenic needs when trying to reform offenders,
this is more than a little disheartening. And this refers to practitioners.
Imagine how bad the case is for “front-line” staff!
Also, “Gendreau and Goggin (1997)
report that only a minority of correctional agencies – perhaps as few as 1 in
10 – function in such a way as to satisfactorily deliver effective treatment
programs.” They identified such problems as “… employing program directors and
staff that have little professional training or knowledge about effective
treatment programs; the failure to assess offenders with scientifically based
actuarial risk instruments; the targeting of factors … for change that are
weakly related or unrelated to recidivism; the use of treatments that were
‘inappropriate’ or delivered with insufficient ‘dosage’ or ‘intensity’; the
failure to include aftercare in the treatment; and a general lack of
therapeutic integrity.”[lxxii]
In our book, “Down the Rabbit
Hole: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime”, Brent McCall and I
identified several of these factors as well as others. These include
staff modeling inappropriate behavior, lending support to criminal values, not
enforcing nor following the rules and rewarding bad behavior and punishing good
behavior.
Overcoming these problems will
require significant structural and cultural changes. This is a daunting task
that will no doubt require herculean efforts to achieve. After all, those who
benefit from the current system are unlikely to embrace the necessary changes.
In the next section I’ll offer a suggestion of how to overcome the serious
problem of entrenched interests. For now I’ll limit myself to discussing the
types of correctional environments necessary to promote offender reform.
In order to facilitate positive
changes in offenders, correctional environments must be punitive while at the
same time providing them with the necessary tools for rehabilitation. Despite
what many may believe, punishment and rehabilitation need not be antithetical
to each other. In fact, employing one with the other is unlikely to make a dent
in the recidivism rate.
Think about it. If they don’t
face an unpleasant environment, what incentive do offenders have to put forth
the arduous effort that reforming themselves requires? Of course, loss of
liberty is itself a punishment, but if that loss results in living conditions
where offenders can spend the lion’s share of their time watching TV, listening
to the radio, playing video games, playing cards, etc., what effect is it
likely to have? It is precisely the discomfort of punishment that will
initially provide them with the motivation to change, and to participate in the
types of programs that will help accomplish this.
However, punishing offenders will
only teach them how not to behave. It won’t show them how to live responsibly.
Furthermore, if the punishment is too harsh it will create resentments and a
backlash, thus undermining reform efforts. The major challenge we thus face is
how to create environments that are punitive enough to inspire change in a
pro-social direction, while not being so punitive as to impede that aim.
Ultimately, what needs to be
implemented in correctional institutions are behavior-management systems, the
express goal being to turn offenders into responsible people. Social Learning
Theory (SLT) provides the appropriate foundation for such systems.[lxxiii] According to SLT “All behavior,
criminal or not, is under the control of rewards and costs that come either
prior to the behavior or after it. In any situation, the contingencies of
rewards and costs are responsible for the acquisition, maintenance, and
modification of human behavior.”[lxxiv] Put
simply, people tend to repeat the behaviors for which they are rewarded and
discontinue those for which they are punished. Thus if criminals are to be
reformed, they must experience a responsible lifestyle as rewarding and an
antisocial lifestyle as punishing.
Also, SLT emphasizes that we
learn from watching others. If we witness someone get rewarded for behaving in
a certain way, we are likely to emulate them. On the other hand, if we see
someone punished for how they conduct themselves, we are unlikely to employ the
same behavior.[lxxv] Importantly, the more a
person is liked and respected, the more likely their behavior is to be copied.
The first step in implementing a
behavior-management system will be to decide what rules to put in place. As it
is criminal behavior we wish to alter, the rules we establish should reflect
this fact.[lxxvi] In addition to banning behaviors
that are explicitly criminal, such as fighting and extortion, for instance,
behaviors indicative of criminality should be prohibited as well. A lack of
consideration for how their behavior affects others, for example, is a common
characteristic shared by offenders. Thus, expressions of this trait, such as
yelling, slamming dominoes, cutting in line, etc., should be banned. On the
other hand, bringing a bowl to chow, or tucking in one’s shirt, or giving a
soup to a friend have nothing to do with one’s propensity to commit crimes,
therefore rules prohibiting these actions make little sense. They also put
undue stress on staff, whose time would be better spent focusing on more
relevant behaviors.
In order to be effective change
agents, correctional personnel need to understand and be able to recognize
behaviors that are indicative of criminality. There are a number of good
sources for obtaining this knowledge. I would recommend “The Criminal
Personality”, a three-volume set by Doctor Samuel Yochelson and Stanton
Samenow, “The Criminal Lifestyle” by Glenn Walters, and “The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct” by James Bonta and D.A. Andrews.
Once the system is in place and
staff have the requisite knowledge, they need to enforce the rules in a firm,
fair and consistent manner. Consistency is absolutely vital. If rules are not
consistently enforced, offenders will get the message that they can sometimes
get away with behaving badly, which hey already believe. They are also likely
to be confused about what’s expected of them. And if behavioral expectations
are unclear, how will they know how to conduct themselves?
Punishments should be
commensurate to the offense. Thus a week in “seg” for yelling would be
inappropriate, as would an “informal” for fighting. Also, punishments should be
administered as closely in time as possible to the offense, and the reason for
the punishment clearly explained to the offender. Employing these two practices
will help the offender to draw a clear connection between his actions and their
consequences.
Furthermore, good behavior should
never be punished, nor should the many be punished for the actions of the few.
This may seem like common sense, but you’d be surprised how often they’ve
occurred in the correctional settings in which I’ve been confined.
Finally, when a system of
punishment is first instituted the inmates may rebel a bit. Remember, many of
these people have never faced consistent consequences for how they behaved. It
should therefore not be surprising that they should chafe when held
accountable. The important thing is for the correctional agency to stay the
course.[lxxvii]
As imperative as punishment is to
a program of offender reform, it will not on its own result in significant
improvements in offender behavior. They must be taught how to behave
appropriately. This is where reinforcement comes into play. [lxxviii]
Whereas behaviors targeted by
punishment tend to decrease, those targeted by reinforcement tend to increase.
In layman’s terms, reinforcement is the rewarding of conduct. That reward may
consist of giving someone something desirable (positive reinforcement), such as
praise, better food, or more recreation; or it may be the removal of something
unpleasant (negative reinforcement), such as being moved out of a lousy cell,
or early release from confinement.
Reinforcements should be applied
to the types of behaviors we wish to increase, i.e. pro-social, responsive actions.
For example, offenders should be rewarded for showing consideration for others
or demonstrating a good work ethic. As with punishment, to be effective
reinforcement must be consistently employed and immediately follow the desired
behavior.[lxxix] While most people
intuitively know that correctional staff should be looking out for rule
violations, it is even more important that they search for pro-social behaviors
to reward. This is because positive reinforcement is more effective than
punishment when it comes to altering behavior. [lxxx]
Vitally, offenders shouldn’t be
rewarded for bad behavior or for the good behavior of others.[lxxxi] Examples
I’ve seen of the former are cutting in line without consequence, showering when
they are supposed to lock up, and keeping jobs they lied to obtain. An example
I witnessed of the latter was everyone in an industries shop was given a
commendation for the good work of one inmate.
While inconsistent and
inappropriate applications of rewards and punishments are sure to subvert the
type of system I’ve been describing, perhaps just as destructive is something
far more common than it ought to be: staff who model irresponsible and
sometimes downright criminal behavior. There are at least two ways in which
these types of behaviors have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of
behavior-management systems:
1) They
lend support to antisocial behavior by providing inmates with a rationalization
for it. When criminals witness staff conducting themselves inappropriately,
they may say something to themselves akin to “See, everybody’s a crook. I just
had the misfortune of getting caught.” This is not the message that
should be sent to offenders.
2) They
lead to a credible charge of hypocrisy. Think about it. How likely is it that
offenders are going to take seriously the admonitions of people who don’t
follow the rules themselves? “Do what I say, not what I do” is a well-known
poor parenting practice and it’s just as ineffective when trying to reform
offenders.
The type of system described
above is captured pretty well by the concept of “Core Correctional Practices”.
This concept was originally developed by Andrews and Kiesling (1980) and
consisted of five principles. In 1989, Andrews and Gendreau increased this amount.
The following is the
updated list:
1) Anti-criminal
modelling
2) Effective
reinforcement
3) Effective
disapproval
4) Effective
use of authority
5) Problem
solving
6) Relationship
skills
7) Cognitive
restructuring
8) Skill
building
9) Motivational
enhancement [lxxxii]
(For a full description, see
attached)
As with programming, to be
effective this scheme will require a significant amount of training, as well as
frequent monitoring to ensure compliance. However, as important is these are,
they are unlikely enough to achieve success. In order to achieve the results we
want, we will need a fresh approach to overcome the aforementioned entrenched
interests. Let’s see how it might be done.
Remunerate Correctional Officials
and Employees Based on Results, i.e., Reduced Recidivism
This subject was discussed in
detail in chapter 6, “Reforming the Reformers,” pgs. 329 –337, in “Down the
Rabbit Hold: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime by Brent McCall
and Michael Liebowitz (2017), a portion of which is quoted below.
“There aren’t very many
occupations where the more an organization fails to achieve its overarching
objective the more its employees stand to make. Corrections is one of them. As
the system is presently designed, the earning potential of those who work in our
nation’s prisons is tied directly to high prison populations and high rates of
recidivism. And so long as that remains the case, society will continue to see
the kind of abysmal results it has witnessed since the advent of the modern
correctional era.
“Prison systems should be
structured in a way that incentivizes reductions in recidivism. Presently they
are not. Politicians and corrections officials may pay lip service to the
importance of reducing the number of offenders returning to our nation’s
prisons, but the fact is the system is set up in a way that encourages high
prison populations.
“Whether prisons are operated by
government officials or privately run, the incentive is to maintain or increase
prison populations. Not only do substantial incarceration rates mean increased
earnings for correctional officers and other rank and file institutional staff
– who are beneficiaries of significant amounts of overtime - [but] private
prisons get paid on a per inmate per diem basis. 83 So the more
inmates they house, the higher the profits for shareholders. By contrast, lower
recidivism means lower earnings for most of those directly involved, regardless
of whether it is a publicly or privately-run institution.
“To be clear, we are not
suggesting that high rates of recidivism are a consciously pursued goal on
anyone’s part. We don’t see the problem as a nefarious conspiracy. To ascribe
intention to any of this seems to us to grant too many people entirely too much
credit. What we are saying is that people respond to the way in which things
are incentivized, and teat the present arrangement is tantamount to
disincentivizing the development or implementation of meaningful strategies to
reduce the rate of recidivism. Stated a bit differently, the present design
inadvertently rewards inaction. Simply put: When one is likely to make more
money from doing nothing than he is from doing something – especially something
as challenging as trying to motivate offenders to undertake the work necessary
to change – it isn’t hard to guess which path he is going to take, i.e., the
path of least resistance.
“In short, the policy of paying
prison staff regardless of results breeds apathy. Imagine for a moment if car
salesmen were paid even if they never sold any cars. How hard do you think they
would work to make sales if they had job security and a steady income stream
even though they didn’t get positive results? Well, when it comes to
corrections, the practice is even worse because the arrangement actually
promotes behaviors antithetical to the public interest. To pay prison staff
regardless of the results they produce is ultimately to endanger public safety…
“High prison populations are
obviously much easier to achieve than low ones. All the former requires is that
institutional staff be uninterested in the behavior of offenders, unwilling to
offer correctives or encouragement, unconcerned with how their own behaviors
impacting the process, and uninvested in outcomes. The rest will, of course,
take care of itself. Under these conditions, a correctional culture will more
or less evolve that contributes to offenders coming in and out of prison unable
to figure out how to break the pernicious cycle.
“Now that’s not to suggest that
criminal offenders are casualties of correctional apathy. Criminals are always
and only casualties of their own refusal to think. The choices they make are
theirs and theirs alone. But that doesn’t mean that society would be justified
in throwing its hands up in the air and decrying that nothing works.
Efforts should still be made to get through to criminal offenders and to
provide them with the knowledge and guidance they need to effectuate positive
changes. Glenn Walters put it this way: ‘Thus, while I am steadfast in my
belief that offenders cannot legitimately use societal injustice as an excuse
for their criminal actions, neither can we as a society realistically escape
our responsibility by putting everything off on the offender.’84
“The only real way to change the
correctional culture in a fundamental way is to change the way in which those
who operate the system are compensated. Adding directives to the pile of
directives already ignored will accomplish nothing at all levels, the incomes
that DOC employees are capable of earning out to be tied directly to three
primary goals. One, preventing escapes. Two, maintaining safety and security in
the institutions. And three, reducing the rate of recidivism.
“Of course, linking employee remunerations
to the attainment of an organization’s goals is not a radical idea. Indeed, it
is how the vast majority of people earn their living, i.e., by producing
positive results for their employers. In the private sector, employees who fail
to contribute to their company’s bottom line soon find themselves out of a job.
And by the same token companies that fail to turn a profit soon find themselves
closing their doors. Applying private sector principles to the running of our
nation’s prison is basically what we are recommending. The primary difference
is that whereas the goal of private companies is to make profits, the goal of
the DOC should be to reduce prison populations, and ultimately crime itself.
“Given that we advocate an
incentive structure that is results-based in the way it is for private
companies, it may be thought that we are advocating privatizing the prison
system. Absolutely not; at least not based on the model of private prisons that
currently exists. Under the present model, private prisons are perhaps even
worse than those run by the state. {Remember, in the U.S., private prisons get
paid based on how many prisoners they house]…
“Some studies have indicated that
the way private prisons generate revenue has led to offenders housed in them
serving even longer sentences than they would if they were housed in state-run
institutions. For example, a study conducted by Anita Mukherjee, an assistant
professor of actuarial science, risk management and insurance at the University
of Wisconsin – Madison’s Wisconsin School of Business, found that ‘prisoners in
private prisons are likely to serve as many as two to three more months behind
bars than those assigned to public prisons.’ 85 And
importantly, Mukherjee notes that ‘despite industry claims to lower recidivism
rates,’ those housed in private prisons are ‘equally likely to commit more
crime after release.’ 86
“According to Peter Kerwin, the
longer prison terms served by those in private prisons are fueled by the
‘widespread use of prison conduct violations.’ 87 In
summarizing, Mukherjee’s findings, Kerwin notes that ‘prisoners in every
demographic, offense and sentence length category accumulated more infractions
if they were assigned to a private prison.’ 88 On whole,
inmates house in private prisons ‘received twice as many infractions as those
in public prisons.’
Although the evidence suggests
that the present American model of prison privatization is a failure
from the standpoint of reducing offender recidivism, Mukherjee states that ‘pay
for performance’ contracts have met with some success in the United Kingdom.89 In
other words, reductions in recidivism have been achieved among those inmates
housed in private facilities paid on the basis of results.
“Ultimately, pay for performance
is the basic model we are proposing. However, we are not suggesting that
prisons have to be privatized in order to implement this format. There are a
number of ways this format could work for government-run institutions. And
although all the details would need to be eventually ironed out, the central
issue is that the compensation structure would have to directly reward the men
and women who work in prisons for positive results. Perhaps bonuses could be
awarded over an employee’s base level pay for reductions in recidivism. The
lower the rate, the higher the bonus. Additional vacation days might be
earnable as well to help reduce employee burnout.
“Initially, this may sound
expensive, but consider that ‘it is estimated that each chronic offender costs
society about 1.3 million dollars over the course of the offender’s
lifetime,’ 90 and that the U.S. presently spends $70
billion a year on corrections. 91 Certainly it makes
sense, given the present state of affairs, to alter the way this money is
allocated, if for no other reason than to reduce the human costs that are
inevitably associated with unchanged offenders. In truth, however, changing the
way the correctional workforce is compensated would likely save money as well
as lives.
“What pay for performance
necessarily would do is fundamentally alter the way prison employees approach
their jobs, thus changing the prevailing correctional culture. The knowledge
that the successful reform of inmates were tied directly to one’s personal
earning potential would make correctional employees much more conscientious
about how their actions or inactions might be impacting results. Accordingly,
they would be more apt to be responsible and invested in the process …
“Of course, pay for performance
would have its limitations. Given that a certain percentage of the offender
population are incorrigible sociopaths, resistant to virtually
all correctional treatment, the rate of recidivism would bottom out
somewhere well above zero. And this would need to be taken into account. The
remuneration of correctional employees should not be adversely affected because
recidivist rates could only be reduced so much. Which is to say, so long as
recidivism continued to decline or remained at some yet-to-be-determined low
point, those responsible for the low rates should be financially rewarded …
“[The idea of remuneration based
on results is of course merely an inchoate recommendation.] There is much to
work out, and many difficulties to overcome before [it] could be effectively
implemented. And no doubt one of the main difficulties would be resistance from
those with a vested interest in the status quo. The loudest protests would
likely come from the correctional unions themselves. They will most certainly
deride [this idea] as impractical, undoable, and implausible. But it seems to
us those are adjectives that more accurately describe sustaining the present
state of affairs.” (The forgoing quoted material is from “Down the Rabbit Hold:
How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime” (proof copy), Ch. 6 “Reforming
the Reformers” pp 329 – 337 by Brent McCall and Michael Liebowitz (2017).)
Subsequent to the publication of
“Down the Rabbit Hole”, while reading “Incarceration Nations” by Baz
Dreisinger, I came across “Serco”, a corporation based in Great
Britain that runs two private prisons in Australia. (I would later discover
that Serco has prisons in other countries as well). Contrary to America’s
private prisons, however, Serco’s contracts include incentives to reduce
recidivism. They are also cheaper to operate than government prisons.92
Given that McCall and I advocated
this concept in our book, I was highly intrigued. This was especially so
because Dreisinger, a critic of prisons who is perhaps particularly hostile to
those which are privately run, seemed to reluctantly approve of Serco’s
institutions. Among other things, she writes “Serco’s London-based think-tank
arm presents a series of seemingly attractive arguments. Treating people more
humanely ultimately costs less, and private prisons are more accountable than government-run
prisons because contracts specify financial penalties for not meeting standards
of health and educational services. Private prisons are cheaper, Serco claims,
because of sound management, efficient staff levels, and flexible practices.”93 I
had to find out more, so I had a friend get me some information about Serco off
the internet.
The information with which my
friend provided me came from two sources. The first was an article published by
the Brennan Center for Justice,94 and the second was Serco’s
official website. Like other sources I’ve seen, the Brennan article mentions
how private prisons in the U.S. get paid more for housing more inmates, have
roughly the same recidivist rates as government prisons, and don’t remunerate
based on results.
The article notes that with Serco
things are different. They award bonuses based on reductions in recidivism, and
the author writes of a Serco-run prison in New Zealand. “Men who follow the
rules, complete educational and vocational programs, and keep a positive
attitude can move from the more traditional housing units into six-room
cottages to prepare them for life outside prison.”
From Serco’s website I learned
that in addition to Australia and New Zealand, Serco also “operate[s] six adult
prisons (with a capacity to hold more than 5,400 prisoners) for the Ministry of
Justice’s National Offender Management Service and the Scottish Prison Service.
“They also claim to have had “outstanding successes in reducing prisoner
reoffending,”95 although they don’t cite the numbers.
The website goes on to say that
“By pursuing a rehabilitative approach to justice, with a focus on addressing
individual criminogenic needs, all with the key outcome of reducing
reoffending, we make offenders less likely to return to the criminal justice
system, helping to rebuild lives, reduce demand on governments and lessen the
financial and wider costs of crime to the communities we serve.”96
While the bulk of what I’ve read
about Serco has been positive, it hasn’t all been so. For instance, a workers’
union has threatened to sue Serco over pay and conditions. There have been
riots in Serco’s prisons, and an inspection by the Australian government
claimed there was overcrowding and poorly trained staff. 97
Ultimately, I don’t know enough
about Serco to determine whether its prison model is one I’d entirely endorse.
However, despite the few instances of negative publicity noted above, the
majority of what I’ve seen seems promising. At any rate, I am absolutely
convinced that a prison system which remunerates based on results would be
vastly superior to the one we have currently.
Privately Fund a Significant Portion
of Reform Programs
I would like to see the bulk of
the suggested offender reform programs – including education – privately
financed. This could be done through charity, social impact bonds, or some
combination of the two. Privately funded program will likely be cheaper, more
effective , and would avoid the incessant debates about whether tax dollars
should be spent in this manner.
The economist David Friedman
asserted that anything done by government could be done in the private sector
for half the cost.98 While I don’t know if anyone has
ever tested this hypothesis, or if the ratio is exact, I do believe the
principle is accurate. This is because when the government funds a project,
those in charge of how the money gets spent know that the government can always
get more via taxes. They thus have little incentive to monitor how much they’re
spending, or how they could spend less and achieve the same result. On the
other hand, private donors are likely to take a great interest in how
efficiently their money is being spent. And given that they aren’t being forced
to provide it, they are likely to stop doing so if it isn’t being spent wisely.
Importantly, those making spending decisions know this, and are therefore
incentivized to make as efficient use of the funds as they can.
Privately funded programs are
likely to be more effective than those funded by the government for the same
reason that they’d be cheaper; namely, if the programs don’t achieve
the results desired by the donors, those doors will likely discontinue funding
them. In other words, privately funded programs are likely to be more effective
because the financial managers of private programs will be held accountable by
those paying their salaries.
Finally, since taxpayers not
being compelled to pay for the programs, they’re unlikely to be concerned with
how many are being provided. They will have little incentive to protest,
petition their representatives, or otherwise complain. And absent pressure from
their constituents, such representatives would have little reason to oppose the
programs.
Core Correctional Practices
Anti-criminal Modeling –
Staff serve as an anti-criminal model for offenders by engaging in pro-social
behaviors and reinforcing them when they do the same.
Effective Reinforcement –
Staff use effective reinforcement to reinforce a specific behavior that
includes immediate statement of approval and support and the reasons why this
behavior is desirable followed by consideration of the short-and-long-term
benefits associated with continued use of the behavior.
Effective Disapproval –
Staff use effective disapproval to communicate disapproval for a specific
behavior that includes immediate statements of disapproval and the reasons why
this behavior is undesirable followed by consideration of the
short-and-long-term costs associated with continued use of the behavior and a
clear demonstration of an alternate, pro-social behavior.
Effective Use of Authority –
Staff make effective use of their authority by guiding offenders toward
compliance, which includes focusing their message on the behavior exhibited,
being direct and specific concerning their demands, and specifying the
offender’s choices and attendant consequences.
Problem Solving – Problem
solving is a specific social skill that is taught to offenders to address a
variety of high-risk situations.
Relationship Skills –
Effective staff possess several critical relationship skills including warm,
open, non-judgmental, empathetic, flexible, engaging, solution-focused and
directive.
Cognitive Restructuring –
Staff need to help offenders understand the link between their thoughts and
their behavior: What they think (e.g., attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs)
affects how someone emotionally and behaviorally responds to a given situation,
as opposed to situations directly dictating a person’s response.
Skill Building – In order
for an offender to learn ways to behave, staff need to teach and proactive new
skills with offenders. There are cognitive skills (e.g., how well people solve
problems, experience empathy toward others, and rationally assess situations )
that affect how a person behaves.
Motivational Enhancement - Effective
staff help motivate offenders to change by increasing intrinsic motivation
(getting them to want to change). Techniques include motivational interviewing,
weighing the pros and cons, and goal setting.
Taken from “What Works (and
Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism”, p. 64, by Edward J. Latessa, Shelley J.
Listwan and Deborah Koetzle, (2015)
____________________________
Notes
[1] All the
preceding historical information was taken from Friedman, Lawrence M., Crime
& Punishment in American History (1993).
[1] Branson, Sam., Ending
the War on Drugs p. 185 (2016). (Book is by various authors).
[1] ibid p. 5, Branson,
Richard.
[1] ibid, p. 17 (no
author named).
[1] ibid, p. 13 (no
author named).
[1] ibid p. 30, Zedillo,
Ernesto,
[1] ibid p. 7, Branson,
Richard.
[1] Friedman,
Lawrence M., Crime & Punishment in American History, p. 357 (1993).
[1] Walsh, Anthony, Criminology: The Essentials,
pp. 26 - 27 (2012).
[1] Zedillo, Ernesto, Ending the War on Drugs, p.
27 (2016).
[1] Walsh, Anthony, Criminology: The Essentials, p.
228, citing McBride & McCoy, 1993; Menard, Mihalic,& Huizinga 2001. (2012).
[1] ibid, pp. 225 – 226.
[1] ibid, citing Parker & Auerhahn, 1998.
[1] ibid, pp. 224 –
225.
[1] ibid, p. 218,
citing m. Robinson, 2005.
[1] Clegg, Nick, Ending
the War on Drugs, pp. 154 – 155 (2016).
[1] ibid, p. 116,
Gaviria, César.
[1] ibid, p. 130,
Obasanjo, Olusegun.
[1] ibid, p. 165, Bém, Pavel.
[1] ibid, p. 166.
[1] ibid, p. 167.
[1] ibid, p. 7, Branson, Richard.
[1] ibid, p. 115, Gaviria, César.
[1] ibid, p. 116.
[1] ibid, p. 8, Branson, Richard.
[1] ibid, p. 30, Zedillo, Ernesto.
[1] Hollin, Clive R., editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 79 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit,
Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Washington State Institute for Public Policy (2018).
[1] Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle,
Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 211 (2014)
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 140 (2017)
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 82 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit,
Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] ibid, p. 83
[1] Washington State Institute for Public Policy (2018).
[1] Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle,
Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 211 (2014).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 87 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit,
Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 142 (2017).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 87 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit,
Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 142 (2017).
[1] Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 6, p. 88 by Swenson, Cynthia Cupit,
Henggeler, Scott W. and Schoenwald, Sonja K. (2004).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 143 (2017).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000), DSST
Criminal Justice Exam Secrets (2014) by Mometrix Media, and Freidman, Lawrence
M. Crime and Punishment in American History, pp. 79, 80, 81 (1993).
[1] Freidman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in
American History, p. 160 (1993).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000), and
Freidman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in American History, p. 304
(1993).
[1] Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000),
[1] ibid, citing Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975).
[1] ibid
[1] ibid, Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The
Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, (2017), and
Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J, and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works
(and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism (2015).
[1] Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 233 (2017).
[1] ibid, p. 175.
[1] ibid.
[1] ibid, p. 176.
53 ibid, p. 180.
54 ibid, pp. 44, 46, 180.
55 Cullen, Francis T., and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospect (2000),
56 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, pp. 256 – 257, (2017).
57 Hollin, Clive R. editor; The Essential Handbook of
Offender Assessment and Treatment, Ch. 5, pp. 64 – 65 by Robinson, David
and Porpino, Frank J. (2004).
58 ibid, p. 67
59 ibid, pp. 68 -69.
60 ibid, pp. 71 – 72.
61 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 47 (2017) and Latessa, Edward
J., Listwan, Shelley J., and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works (and Doesn’t) in
Reducing Recidivism, pp. 95 – 96 2015).
62 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 235 (2017).
63 Alternatives to Violence Project, Advanced Manual
(2005).
64 ibid.
65 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 127 citing Sykes and Matza,
1957 (2017), Walters, Glenn, The Criminal Lifestyle, p. 131 (1990), and
Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal Personality Vol. l,
p. 366 (1993).
66 Alternatives to Violence Project, Basic Manual, p. A –
11 (2002).
67 ibid.
68 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle,
Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 91 (2015)
and Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal Personality Vol. ll,
pp. 299 – 300 (2004).
69 Halgin, Richard and Krauss Whitbourne, Susan, Abnormal
Psychology, p. 318 (2007), Walters, Glenn, The Criminal Lifestyle,
p. 173 (1990), and Yochelson, Samuel and Samenow, Stanton, The Criminal
Personality Vol. ll, p. 36, (2004).
70 Cullen, Francis T and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects (2000), and Bonta, James and Andrews, D. A., The
Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 247 (2017).
71 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 146 (2017), and Latessa,
Edward J. Listwan, Shelley J., and Koetzle, Deborah, What Works (and
Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 195 (2015).
72 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, pp. 349 - 350 (2017).
73 Cullen, Francis T. and Gendreau, Paul, Assessing
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects (2000).
74 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle, Deborah;
What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 66 (2015).
75 Bonta, James, and Andrews, D.A., The Psychology of
Criminal Conduct, 6th Edition, p. 49 (2017).
76 Latessa, Edward J., Listwan, Shelley J. and Koetzle,
Deborah; What Works (and Doesn’t) in Reducing Recidivism, p. 67 (2015).
77 ibid, p. 78
78 ibid, p. 75
79 ibid, p. 75.
80 ibid, p. 69.
81 ibid, p. 76.
82 ibid, pp. 63 – 64.
83 McCall, Brent, and Liebowitz, Michael, Down the
Rabbit Hole: How the Culture of Corrections Encourages Crime (Proof copy),
Footnote 353, from the August 2015 issue of Prison Legal News, p. 43 (2017).
84 ibid, Footnote 354, from Walters, Glenn, The
Criminal Lifestyle, p. 178 (1990).
85 ibid, Footnote 358, from the January 16, 2016 issue of
Prison Legal News, p. 26.
86 ibid, Footnote 358, ibid.
87 ibid, Footnote 360, ibid, p. 27
88 ibid, Footnote 361, ibid.
89 ibid, Footnote 362, “Mukherjee’s research ‘Do Private
Prisons Distort Justice? Evidence of Time Served and Recidivism’, is available
on the Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com”.
90 ibid, Footnote 363, from Bartol, Curt and Bartol, Ann,
Current Perspectives in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Justice, p. 7
(2006).
91 ibid, Footnote 364, from the August 2015 issue of
Prison Legal News, p. 34
92 Dreisinger, Baz, Incarceration Nations, p. 210
(2016).
93 ibid, p. 211.
94 Eisen, Lauren-Brooke, How to Create More Humane
Private Prisons, November 14, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org.
96 ibid
97 Dreisinger, Baz, Incarceration Nations p. 222
(2016).
98 Friedman, David, The Machinery of Freedom, Third
Edition
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