Shortly after Governor Dannel Malloy nominated his chief counsel Andrew
McDonald to Connecticut’s Supreme Court, the Day of New London noted that it
was “a testament of how far Connecticut has come that the least controversial
fact about Andrew J. McDonald, nominated by Gov. Dannel P. Malloy on Thursday
to join the state Supreme Court, is that he is openly gay.”
When Mr. Malloy announced awhile back that his administration was the
gayest in Connecticut history, no one bated an eyelash. Mr. McDonald was
married to Charles Gray in 2009 by then Mayor of Stamford Malloy; under
Secretary for Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Michael Lawlor, the author
of the problem ridden Earned Risk Reduction Credits program, is also openly gay.
A few decades ago, gays in Connecticut occupied on the ladder of social
acceptance a rung a little bit below that of lepers and Republicans. Mere
association with gays over the years utterly destroyed the prejudice against
them. Familiarity does not always breed contempt; sometimes it breeds a loving
understanding.
Connecticut abolished the last of its progressively ameliorated penalties for sodomy in 1969. In 2004, a
Superior Court, rejecting a claim that the constitution did not permit merely
an “equivalent nomenclature for such
protection and process,” found Connecticut’s Civil Union marriage law
was not inconsistent with a Connecticut constitutional provision requiring
equal protection and due process of law. Then Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, now a U.S. Senator, declined
to argue the case when it was appealed to Connecticut’s Supreme Court but sent a functionary to do so. It was
supposed by some commentators at the time that Mr. Blumenthal did not wish to
step into a mare’s nest that might have impacted his future plans to run for
national office. In 2008, the Supreme Court issued a ruling guaranteeing same
sex marriage rights and striking down the legislature’s civil union provisions
as unconstitutional. Bowing to the high court’s ruling, the General Assembly
codified same sex marriage in 2009.
Following Mr. Malloy’s press release
announcing his nomination of Mr. McDonald to Connecticut’s already progressive
and politically attuned high court, CTMirror noted:
“As a justice, McDonald would bring to the state's highest court the perspective of a politician who struggled to draft and pass legislation on the death penalty, gay marriage, transgender rights, gun control and drug penalties.
"’The Judiciary Committee is the legislative cauldron for all of that,’ McDonald said in 2009, when the panel drew the ire of Catholic clergy by considering a bill that could have forcibly reorganized the finances of Catholic parishes.”
Mr. McDonald is a bit of a cauldron himself.
Not only would the bill written by the two co-chairs of the General Assembly’s
Judiciary Committee, Mr. Lawlor and Mr.
McDonald, have “forcibly reorganized the finances of Catholic parishes,” it
would have changed the apostolic nature of the Catholic Church in Connecticut
and as such indicates a remarkable insensitivity to the history of church-state
relations in the United States.
In the colonial period, the General Court, the
Congregational governing body for the state, was a theocratic instrument that
suppressed religious dissent and blocked the gateway of religious liberty for
other denominations. Had the bill proposed by Mr. Lawlor and Mr. McDonald come
before the Connecticut Supreme court on review, one might hope that a majority
of the justices would have regarded SB 1098 as an instrument of religious
suppression that violated the “free exercise” clause of the First Amendment, the "Supremacy clause," and the
Fourteenth Amendment barring discriminatory legislation. The bill written by
Mr. Lawlor and Mr. McDonald was narrowly contrived to affect only the Catholic
Church in Connecticut. The state’s high court, some fear, may be less likely to
render dispassionate justice should Connecticut’s General Assembly, no longer a
theocratic body committed to a Protestant form of church governance, affirm the
governor’s nomination.
Comments
Cathy Ludlum's case against Public Act 12-33, which supersedes the executive orders, may well wind up before the Connecticut Supreme Court. McDonald has shown by his extreme statements treating an issue of the rights of people with disabilities (specifically, employers with disabilities) as "radical Right" to be biased and unable to fairly judge this case. Will McDonald pledge to recuse himself from this case? And what about other cases where McDonald has acted on behalf of the Malloy administration and which may come before the court?