By Daria Novak
The three other researchers include another WIV researcher,
Ma Haixia, a Chinese Academy of Sciences researcher Liang Huigang, and Xiang
Xiaowei of the Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan. Together
they explained that China lacks a law solely dedicated to biosafety regulation,
or a complete supervisory system for handling new biotechnologies.
These scientists are not the only ones aware of the deficits
in China’s biosafety regimes for its research labs. They are, however, among
the few scientific elite in China writing about the specifics of biosafety prior
to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Months later, February 14, 2020, President-for-Life Xi
Jinping addressed the need for comprehensive new and revised laws to deal with
biohazards in a talk to senior members of the State Council. What is most
revealing, however, is his choice of words. With the change of only one character,
his speech morphed from a talk on biosafety
to one on biosecurity.
Reading the English version, one might not notice the change
of “shengwu anquan” to “shengwu anbao.” In some languages, biosafety and
biosecurity are one concept comprised of a single word. In China, this is no
longer the case. Less than a decade ago, Beijing split the term into two separate
and critical concepts.
“Biosafety” now references organism-related, human or
non-human factors, that may pose a risk to life, including public health, the
economy, social stability, and the natural environment. Biosafety therefore
focuses primarily on the principle technologies and physical practices in a
laboratory that prevent the unintended exposure of pathogens and toxins to the
outside environment.
In contrast, “biosecurity” addresses the use of biological
agents, or biotechnology, as bioweapons or bioterrorism, including the
organism’s ability to harm the national security of the state. This is what apparently
concerned President Xi in his February address and should concern the world
today.
The Asia-Pacific Biosafety Association held its 13th
annual bio-risk conference in Beijing last August. It is a gathering of top
scientific minds in the region. The 2019 topic was “Strategizing Biosafety and
Biosecurity in Today’s Advancing Technological Era and Changing Security
Landscape.” Both terms are clearly included in the name of the conference.
The conference agenda, although written in poor English, highlights
that “special features [of the conference] include current hottest debate on
harnessing sciences vs bio-threat of multidiscipline, updates on new innovative
biotechnology, duel-use, etc….” This conference specifically highlights
dual-use bioresearch as a focus of bio-threats and biosecurity.
Whether a Chinese dual-use biolab in Wuhan “weaponized” a
naturally occurring pathogen accidentally by human error, as part of a bio-defense
strategy, or even as part of a long-term offensive goal, we do not yet know.
What is certain is that China is studying viruses, discussing biological
warfare, and planning a national defense strategy that includes a less than
transparent biosecurity program.
Significantly, even prior to Covid-19, there were concerns
of a similar virus escaping from the Chinese BLS Level-4 lab, which handles the
world’s deadliest pathogens. In 2014, Wang Qian, an official in the Department
of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
wrote an article entitled, “Efforts to Strengthen Biosafety and Biosecurity in
China.” She points out that concern has grown in China about the “possibility
of infectious diseases spreading across national boundaries….”
Qian goes on to state: “Compared to nuclear and chemical
weapons, not only are biological weapons cheaper, they are easier to acquire
because of the availability of dual-use equipment and materials on the open
market.” Her citation on this point comes from the US Congress’ Office of
Technology Assessment.
Qian also cites an Arms
Control Today article, noting that genetic engineering “has made it
possible to increase the virulence of disease agents or make them more
contagious or environmentally persistent.”
Even more alarming is Qian’s later discussion of the former Soviet
Union employing genetic engineering to make biowarfare agents “resistant to
known medical treatments.” These concerns are from a member of China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs who appears well-placed to understand Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) intentions.
In February Xi elevated biosecurity to a national security
issue. Considering the unfolding of the COVID-19 crisis at that time, it is
doubtful that Xi’s important announcement was a quick decision unrelated to
other events. China is also hosting a UN conference this October in Kunming on
biosecurity. The agenda notes the event will showcase China’s efforts in the
field.
The timing of Xi’s speech, his specific use of term
biosecurity, and elite Chinese scientists writing for years of their concern
over the use of biological agents, are clearly signs of concern.
Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University
was on point when he said: “These facilities are inherently dual use.” Covid-19
lifted the veil. The world can no longer ignore China’s biosafety, biosecurity,
and potentially bioweapons, ambitions. The international community should
demand transparency and visibility into China’s dual-use bioresearch programs.
Daria Novak is the
Executive Vice President of ERUdyne, a Virginia based company that
helps American companies negotiate and do business overseas. Following 9-11,
the company expanded to conduct work in the national and homeland security
arenas, protecting and improving the critical infrastructure of the United
States. The publication above is reprinted
from NY Analysis of Policy and Government.
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